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TURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Recipients/Appellants have intentionally limited the scope of this 
Brief to the issues that they believe this Court intended to hear, based on the 
Court's May 30, 2007 Order.1 The Order granted this interlocutory appeal and 
stated two issues: 
1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction, pursuant to rule 5 of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, to review the December 22, 2006 
"order on motion for decertification", in light of the district court's 
subsequent minute entry, dated January 12, 2007, designating the 
December 22 order "provisional", and its February 15, 2007 order 
designating the December 22 order as "final" without making any 
modifications to it. 
2. If so, whether the district court's December 22, 2006 decision and 
order decertifying the class was erroneous. 
R. 4318-4321, Supreme Court's Order of May 30,2007, Addendum 5. Recipients 
accept statement two as a limitation of scope and a denial by the Court of the 
Initially, Recipients requested that this Court "entertain in this 
interlocutory appeal [nine] other interlocutory orders where the resolution of these 
matters will have a 'meaningful effect' on the parties and result in a more speedy 
and certain resolution of this litigation which is now in its 13th year." Plaintiffs' 
Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, March 7, 2007 (not 
included in the official Record). 
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request to entertain the other motions noted in the Petition, and will limit their 
response unless notified by the Court to the contrary. 
The appropriate standard of appellate review is "correctness," since 
both issues are questions of law (legal interpretation of a rule of appellate 
procedure and a case holding). This Court gives no deference to trial court rulings 
interpreting statutes and cases. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 
P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). 
Related Questions. Recipients believe that there are two additional 
legal issues that track exactly with the scope of this appeal as set forth in the 
5/30/07 Order. These additional issues are: 
1. What are the appropriate class criteria, given the ruling in 
Houghton III? 
2. Should the Plaintiffs have full discovery on remand? 
In a nutshell, we believe this Court has already determined the answrer to the first 
question in Houghton HI, and need only restate it on remand as the qualifying class 
criteria. This would greatly assist the fair and speedy resolution of this case. 
As to discovery, the limited discovery allowed below has severely 
hampered and obstructed the resolution of this matter. This Court has twice 
previously instructed the trial court to grant full discovery, but the trial court did 
not follow that admonition. On remand, there should be an unmistakable order 
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granting/*/// iliscovay so that all pertinent matters may be presented for resolution. 
This will also greatly speed the case along. 
If we have overstepped our bounds in asking for consideration of 
these two closely related matters, we apologize in advance. The arguments thereon 
will be very brief, and we believe the Court will agree that they should be 
considered as part of this interlocutory appeal. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Two sections of the Medical Benefits Recovery Act ("Act") are 
controlling, at least in part (with the relevant language highlighted): 
A. Recovery of Lien by the State [1998] 
26-19-5. Recovery of medical assistance from third party - Lien — Notice « 
Action - Compromise or waiver — Recipient's right to action protected. 
[1998] 
(1) (a) When the department provides or becomes obligated to provide medical 
assistance to a recipient because of an injury, disease, or disability that a third 
party is obligated to pay for, the department may recover the medical assistance 
directly from that third party. 
(b) The department's claim to recover medical assistance provided as a result of the 
injury, disease, or disability is a lien against any proceeds payable to or on behalf 
of the recipient by that third party. This lien has priority over all other claims to 
the proceeds, except claims for attorney fees and costs authorized under Subsection 
26-19-7(4). 
(2) The department shall mail or deliver written notice of its lien to the third party 
at its principal place of business or last known address. The notice shall include a 
recipient name, the approximate date of injury, a general description of the type 
of injury and, if applicable, the general location where the injury is alleged to have 
occurred. 
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(3) The department may commence an action on its lien in its own name, but that 
lien is not enforceable as to a third party unless: 
(a) the third party receives written notice of the department's lien 
before it settles with the recipient; or 
(b) the department has evidence that the third party had knowledge 
that the department provided or was obligated to provide medical 
assistance. 
(4) The department may waive a claim against a third party in whole or in part, or 
may compromise, settle, or release a claim or lien. 
(5) An action commenced under this section does not bar an action by a recipient 
or a dependent of a recipient for loss or damage not included in the department's 
action. 
(6) The department's lien on proceeds under this section is not affected by the 
transfer of the proceeds to a trust, account, or other financial instrument. 
(Emphasis added.) 
B. Recovery by Recipient - Attorney's Fees 
26-19-7. Action or claim by recipient - Consent of department required -
Department's right to intervene - Department's interests protected -
Attorney's fees and costs. [1995] 
(1) (a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence an action, or settle, 
compromise, release, or waive a claim against a third party for recovery of medical 
costs for an injury, disease, or disability for which the department has provided or 
has become obligated to provide medical assistance, without the department's 
written consent. 
(b) The department has an unconditional right to intervene in an action 
commenced by a recipient for recovery of medical costs connected with the same 
injury, disease, or disability, for which it has provided or has become obligated to 
provide medical assistance. 
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(2) (a) If the recipient proceeds without the department's written consent as 
required by Subsection (l)(a), the department is not bound by any decision, 
judgment, agreement, or compromise rendered or made on the claim or in the 
action. 
(b) The department may recover in full from the recipient or any party to which 
the proceeds were made payable all medical assistance which it has provided and 
retains its right to commence an independent action against the third party, subject 
to Subsection 26-19-5(3). 
(3) The department's written consent, if given, shall state under what terms the 
interests of the department may be represented in an action commenced by the 
recipient. 
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total recovery for attorney 
fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in an action that is commenced 
with the departments written consent. 
(Emphasis added.) 
CONTROLLING CASE LAW 
1. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2005 UT 63, 125 P.3d 860 {"Houghton III"). 
2. State v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, 999 P.2d 572 ("McCoy"). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Certification on Attorney Fees Issue. This action was filed on 
October 27, 1995, and Class II plaintiffs (recipients with attorneys) were certified 
as a class by stipulation on January 29, 1996. R. 1, 98 and 100. In Houghton HI, 
the State challenged the certification on the grounds that the attorney fees claim 
was insufficiently noticed. This Court rejected that claim noting "[w]e therefore 
conclude that plaintiffs' notice of claim was sufficient to communicate the nature 
of the [attorney fees] claim they now assert." Houghton v. DepL of Health, 2005 UT 
63, 125 P.3d 860, If 23 (llHoughton III") (parenthetical added). 
Three Prior Appeals. In the first appeal, this Court reversed 
disqualification of Plaintiffs' counsel. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 962 P.2d 58 
(Utah 1998). In the second appeal, this Court unanimously reversed the trial 
court's dismissal of the Class II Plaintiffs' attorney fee claims. See Houghton v. 
Department of Health, 2002 UT 101, 57 P.3d 1067, MI 10, 11 (uHoughton IF). On 
the third appeal, this Court unanimously held that the trial court misinterpreted 
both the statute and this Court's ruling in State v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, 999 P.2d 
572. The State's obligation to pay a proportionate attorney's fee was not 
dependent on "whether the recipient expressly excluded the State's claim," but on 
whether consent had been requested. "In all cases" where consent was requested, 
the State owed "its proportionate share of attorney's fees." Houghton III, 111148,49. 
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The Court also reversed the trial court's failure to grant discovery and criticized its 
unduly narrow interpretation of McCoy. Sec Houghton III, 1111 49-5 1. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are relevant to the consideration of this 
interlocutory appeal: 
Limited Discovery and Early Focus on Decertification 
1. Decertification Was the Focus on Remand. The Utah 
Supreme Court ordered full discovery on remand. Houghton HI, UU 38. However, 
in the very first hearing after remand the trial court noted "on the basis of the 
record before me, [I see] no common issue that would justify the case continuing as 
a class action". R. 4337 (Transcript of 1/13/06 Hearing, emphasis added). With 
that encouragement, Defendants filed another motion to decertify on February 17, 
2006. R. 2087. Class decertification was confirmed as a "final order" on February 
15, 2007, 11 years after the class was first certified. R. 4291. 
2. Fourth Appeal. This fourth appeal deals with the trial court's 
failure to follow the Houghton III ruling defining class criteria which specifically 
recognized that Medicaid recipients are entitled to have the State pay a 
"proportionate share" of the recipient's attorney fees for recovering the State's lien, 
with consent. Houghton III, Hlf 39, 49. Other related motions important to the 
class were also denied. R. 4291. 
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3. Limited Discovery in Eleventh Year of Litigation. Due to 
persistent resistance by the State, no discovery was had until 2006. R. 106, 608 
and 802. Judge Quinn's 2003 ruling limiting the scope of discovery was appealed 
and this Court held that the "district court adopted an erroneously narrow view of 
our holding in McCoy " Houghton III, H 50. This Court reversed and remanded 
with "instructions to modify the scope of the discovery order consistent with this 
opinion." Id. The trial court ignored this instruction and allowed only narrow 
discovery focused on whether the class should be decertified. Fact 1 above; 
R. 4337; R. 2047, Order Re: Production of Documents, Confidentiality, and 
Briefing of Class Certification of Issues. 
Failure to Follow Houghton III 
4. Trial Court Adopts Wholly New Standard. The trial court's 
recent Order of 12/22/06 inexplicably ignores Houghton Ill's requirement that the 
State is required to "pay a proportionate share of the plaintiffs attorney fees," and 
instead adopts a wholly new "reasonable fee" standard determined by the "totality 
of the circumstances." Compare Houghton 111, MI 39, 49 with the 12/22/06 
Provisional Decertification Order, pps. 27, 20. R. 1895, 4194. 
5. New Standard is Basis of Decertification. Because what is 
"reasonable" varies under the "totality of the circumstances," the trial court 
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reasoned that numerous individual issues predominate, justifying decertification 
due to lack of "predominance." 12/22/06 Provisional Order, pps. 29, 38, 42-44. 
6. Trial Court Criticizes Supreme Court. The trial court 
franldy criticized the Supreme Court's Opinion in Houghton HI as "not completely 
consistent" and "unexplained," among other criticisms. 12/22/06 Provisional 
Order, pps. 28-9, R. 4194. 
Discovery and Spoliation of Evidence 
7. About 2,786 Potential Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs deposed Brent 
Perry, Director of the Bureau of Medical Collections of ORS, who stated that the 
State's "database" could be queried as to third-party liability ("TPL") cases. 
R. 3527, Brent Perry Depo., p. 116:7-11. The query produced an 80-page 
document with 2,786 entries. See R. 3529-3610. This document purports to list 
all TPL recoveries in tort cases resulting in lien reimbursement where the recipient 
apparently had an attorney.2 There are other codes on the document, and other 
information may be able to be produced. Since discovery was limited, it is unclear 
whether this includes all potential class members. 
2
 The first page of R. 3529 states that this is "Defendants' Fourth 
Production of Documents" and that the query includes "personal injury case files 
from November 1, 1994, to present." It then provides information "that includes 
attorney involvement, ORS reimbursement, case name, case number, open/close 
dates and whether a collection agreement was sent." See R. 3529. 
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8. Preliminary Data on 412 Cases Examined. Analysis of the 
data from the computer narratives of the 412 "cases," and the smattering of hard 
files that remain, shows: 
412 - Files examined 
421 - Actual number of claims filed in the 412 cases 
286 - Cases where: 1) lien reimbursement amount, 2) consent 
received or requested and 3) amount of attorney fee 
payment can aU be determined (67%*) 
254 - Consent Requested (i.e., it can be determined) (89%T) 
27 - 33% (or proportionate) fee allowed (consent agreement 
present) (11% of 254 cases*) 
19 - 30% fee allowed (consent agreement present) (8%*) 
1 - 28% fee allowed (consent agreement present) (< 1%*) 
2 - 27% fee allowed (consent agreement present) (<1%") 
1 - 26% fee allowed (consent agreement present) (< 1%*) 
58 - 25% fee allowed (consent agreement present) (23%*) 
I - 24% fee allowed (consent agreement present) (<1%?) 
3 - 2 1 % fee allowed (consent agreement present) (1%*) 
93 - 20% fee allowed (consent agreement present) (37%?) 
I I - 1%-19% fee allowed (consent agreement present) (4%?) 
38 - No fee paid (consent requested or agreement present) 
(15%*)3 
R. 4165. 
9. Significance of Discovery Thus Far. It is clear from the 
information provided that, due to spoliation and inadequate discovery, only 286 
of the 421 claims (67%) had information sufficient to determine class criteria. 
Assuming the same percentages hold for all 2,786 cases as exist for the 42leases, 
3 3 % of those or 919 cases lack sufficient information to determine McCoy/Houghton 
Legend:* Percentage of 4 2 1 , f Percentage of 286, * Percentage of 254. 
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777 class criteria.4 Therefore, if the ubiquitous 33% attorneys fee were present in 
essentially all of the projected 2,786 cases, about 2,500 (89%) recipients who 
secured lien reimbursement for the State were paid less than a proportionate fee. 
This group constitutes the putative class. 
10. Spoliation of Evidence is Admitted. Massive spoliation 
occurred in this case in that virtually all the hard case files prior to 2001 were 
destroyed, during the litigation. The computer narratives that remain are often 
woefully incomplete. O.R.S. boss Brent Perry testified regarding this destruction: 
Q. All right. And do you know if paper files have been 
destroyed during that time, despite the fact that there's litigation 
going? 
A. I can tell you that we have files [back] to 2001. Prior to 
that the paper files were destroyed. 
Q. Even despite the fact that there was litigation? 
A. I guess, yes. 
R. 3520-3521, Perry Depo. 60:7-61:3 (emphasis, double emphasis and 
parenthetical added). Thus, despite awareness of the Houghton litigation, files were 
destroyed yearly, resulting in the loss of about 7-9 crucial years. The 1991-2000 
4Of the 286 claims reviewed, 254 had specific requests for consent as well 
as information regarding the percentage fee paid. Of those 254, an attorney fee of 
less than 33% was paid in about 89% of the total cases. This means about 2,480 
recipients of the 2,786 potential class members were most likely paid less than the 
required proportional fee. In approximately 15% of the cases, no fee was paid even 
though there was a consent agreement. In about74% of the cases, the fee paid was 
30% or less. See Fact 8 above. 
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files represent the critical pre-McCoy years before there was a policy change in 
about 2001, and a statute change in 2005. Sec Fact 24. 
11. Fruit of Spoliation: Difficulty in Determining Consent. 
Due to spoliation, it is nearly impossible to determine from the remaining records 
whether consent was given, whether it was requested and denied, and the reasons 
for the alleged denial. This is verified by the State's own description of cases in its 
Decertification Memorandum II, 9/1/06, pps. 7-10, R. 2813-2816.5 Mr. Perry 
testified it would be very difficult to determine whether a lien was reduced in order 
to pay attorney fees. R. 3527, Perry Depo. 114:19-115:8. This prejudices 
approximately one-third to 40% of the total cases, since much information cannot 
be determined from computer narratives alone. See samples, R. 3612-3632. 
Payment, Accounting and Value of Claims. 
12. No Attorney Fee Paid on Cases Under $1,000. The States 
policy was to pay no attorney fees if the recovery was under $ 1,000. See R. 3631 
5
 These State-cited cases (R. 2813-2816) contain a description of "28 case 
files" where the State admits that "the recipient's request for consent was denied" 
and there was no contribution made for the recipient's attorney fees. Id. at p. 7. 
Of the 28 cases listed on these pages, 12 of them note that it is "unclearfrom the 
notes why consent was denied." Id. (Items 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 23 and 
24) (emphasis added). In another 13 cases, the phrase "consent was apparently 
denied" appears 13 times. Id. (Items 1,3,7,9, 10, 12, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 
25) (emphasis added). Thus, due to lack of information in the "narratives," it is 
either "unclear" or questionable about why consent was denied in 25 of 28 cases 
cited by the defense. We cannot go back to the hard case files to investigate 
because they have been destroyed. 
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("It is our ORS policy to offer a collection agreement to the attorneys when the 
Medicaid lien goes over $1,000"). There are approximately 1,300 such cases 
valued at somewhere in the neighborhood of $430,000. 
13. No Consent Offered on IHC/Other Collection Cases. The 
State had a policy for some time of not offering consent on any cases where it had 
an agreement with IHC or other HMOs to collect medical expenses for the HMO. 
See R. 3811-3849, Case Nos. C000265067 and C000269953. 
14. No Attorney Fees Paid. The number of cases where an 
attorney fee was not paid appears to number approximately 100 cases during the 
period 1994-2001. See examples in R. 3633-3642, Case No. C000156273, p. 3; 
and Case No. C000156239, p. 5. 
15. Approximate Dollar Value of Class Claims. The States 
summary purportedly shows TPL collections from approximately 1994 to 2006. 
R. 3529-3610. During this 12-year period, the State collected approximately 
$18,000,000 in Medicaid reimbursement from recipients who brought third party 
claims. Based on our preliminary evaluation without full discovery, the State paid 
an average of 22% for attorney fees (Fact 8 above) when it was required to pay a 
proportionate amount, usually 33%. Accordingly, Plaintiffs estimate that a 33% 
attorney fee, or $6,000,000, was owed, and that the State paid only about 2/3 of 
that, or $4,000,000, and that $2,000,000 is still owing. 
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16. Recipients Typically Pay at Least a One-Third Attorney 
Fee on TPL Claims. In virtually all cases, the typical Medicaid recipient with a 
TPL claim pays his or her attorney a minimum contingent fee of one-third on the 
givss recovay (and many pay 40% on difficult cases).6 See R. 3778-3782, Affidavit 
of Colin King, Esq., and R. 3784-3788, Affidavit of Steven Sullivan, Esq. 
Interlocutory Appeal Was Timely 
17. January 12th Minute Entry Not "Advisory" Due to 3 Days 
for Mailing. The trial court's provisional "Order on Motion for Decertification" 
was filed by the court on Friday, December 22, 2006, and was mailed on the same 
day. R. 4194. Ignoring for a moment the trial court's own designation of the 
12/22/06 Order as "provisional," the time for filing an interlocutory appeal of the 
December 22nd Order would be twenty days, plus three days mailing under Rule 
22(d), Utah R. App. P.7 Under a correct computation, the deadline was Tuesday, 
6
 As a matter of course, with a rare exception for special circumstances, the 
recipient always pays his/her attorney the percentage fee agreed on \ht gross amount 
of the recovery, and not on the net. Recipients typically pay all liens, including 
medicaid liens, out of their share of the recovery. Costs and liens are seldom 
deducted from the gross recovery before the attorney fee is determined. R. 3778-
82, 3784-88. 
7
 Twenty days from the December 22nd order would be January 11th. With 
the additional three days for mailing, the deadline falls on Sunday, January 14th. 
The 15th was a federal holiday. Thus the actual deadline is Tuesday, January 16th. 
This computation of time arrives at the same result whether the 3 mailing days are 
calculated at the beginning or end of the 20 day period. 
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January 16, 2007, meaning the court's Januaiy 12, 2007 Minute Entry designating 
the December 22nd Order as "not final ... provisional" could not be "advisorv" 
under the State's theory. R. 4254. 
18. Supplemental Briefs Related to Decertification. The 
12/22/06 Provisional Decertification Order observes that the decision "to decertify 
the class potentially impacts at least some of the various pending motions from the 
parties." For that reason, the court ordered the parties to "submit supplemental 
briefs by January 12, 2007 addressing any impact of today's ruling on the various 
outstanding motions." Then, 
Once the parties have filed the supplemental briefs, this Court wall 
schedule a hearing to hear arguments on all remaining outstanding 
motions. 
R. 4194-4248, p. 54 (emphasis added). 
19. January 9,2007 Inquiry by Counsel. Because the trial court 
solicited additional briefs for filing after the interlocutory appeal cut-off date, 
Plaintiffs7 counsel faxed Judge Quinn the 1/9/07 letter. R. 4249. Counsel therein 
pointed out possible problems because the briefs were due after "the time for 
appealing the decertification [order] will have undoubtedly passed." R. 4249.8 
8
 Counsel suggested that the court make it clear that Order was not "not a 
final Order until such time as you have ruled on these other matters." R. 4249. 
The letter then concluded with the statement that "It is an unusual situation and 
I am not quite sure exactly how to proceed, but I do need to protect the right to 
appeal, as you can well imagine." R. 4250 (emphasis added). 
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20. December 22nd Order Clarified as "Provisional." Judge 
Quinn's 1/12/07 responsive Minute Entry clarified that "the Court's Order of 
December 22, 2006 is not intended as a final order," but "should he considered 
provisional" until the additional motions were heard on January 23, 2007. 
R. 4254 (emphasis added). 
21 . The Trial Court Adopts 12/22/06 Order Anew in 01/23/07 
Hearing. The additional motions were heard in oral argument on January 23, 
2007. R. 4273. The court then adopted the 12/22/06 Provisional Order anew, as 
this colloquy reveals: 
MR. SYKES: Are you going to then issue just a revision of 
your prior order [of 12/22/06] incorporating everything? 
THE COURT: Let's have Mr. Lott prepare the order on 
today's [1/23/07] hearing denying those motions on the basis that 
I've stated and stating that the Court adopts the order dated 12/22 
as its order for the issues addressed therein. 
Official Transcript 01/23/07 Hearing, p. 62:8-14,20-24, R. 4337 (emphasis and 
parenthetical added). 
22. Interlocutory Appeal Anticipated by All. The court and all 
counsel anticipated the interlocutory appeal from the reincorporated 12/22/06 
Provisional Order, and discussed this at the 01/23/07 hearing. R. 4437-8 
(Transcript, p. 63:1-7). The Court requested that Plaintiffs' counsel file a motion 
for a stay "once you know whether or not the Supreme Court has accepted your 
interlocutory appeal." R.4337 (Transcript of 1/23/07 hearing, pps. 63-4). 
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23. Revised Order of 02/15/07 Makes 12/22/06 Order Final. 
The trial court issued its revised Order on February 15, 2007. R. 4291-4295, 
Addendum 4 herein. That 2/15/07 Order reflects, inter alia, under a subtitle 
"Impact of December 22, 2006 Order," that the court's Order of that date 
"necessarily impacts Plaintiffs' remaining motions as addressed herein." It 
proceeds to discuss those motions and the court's ruling thereon. The Order then 
contains a bold heading which states "The December 22, 2006 Order on Motion 
for Decertification Is Now a Final Order." The Order finally recites: 
The Court's January 12, 2007 Minute Entry provided that the 
December 22, 2006 Order was not intended to be a final order until 
after consideration of the additional motions addressed herein. ... 
There will be no modifications to the December 22, 2006 Order on 
Motion for Decertification. ... With the signing of this Order, the 
December 22, 2006 Order is now a final order. 
R. 4291-4295, p. 3 (emphasis and double emphasis added). Accordingly, "the 
December 22, 2006 Order on Motion for Decertification" was unow a final order" 
on 2/15/07. 
Legislature Adopted "Proportionate" Standard 
24. Legislative Change Adopts 33.3% Fee. During almost all of 
this litigation, until the year 2005, the statute in effect was exactly as quoted 
herein. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4). In 2005, the Legislature amended the 
statute to confirm the State's obligation to pay an attorney's fee of 33.3% "of the 
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department's total recovery," as well as "a proportionate share of the litigation 
expenses directly related to the action."Utah Code Ann. §26-19-7(2) (c)(ii) (2005). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. 
Recipients' petition for interlocutory appeal was timely filed because 
the trial court designated the December 22, 2006 decertification order as 
"provisional" and "not final" until the January 23, 2007 hearing. The order arising 
from the January 23, 2007 hearing was signed on February 15, 2007, and a timely 
petition for interlocutory appeal was filed on March 7, 2007. 
B. 
The class decertification order was erroneous because it failed to apply 
this Court's Houghton HI standard requiring the State to pay a proportionate share 
of attorney fees as long as the recipient or his attorney requested consent. 
C. 
This Court should rule unequivocally that the class-qualifying criteria, 
based on the language in Houghton III, are 1) a state lien reimbursement, 2) 
obtained by recipient's attorney, and 3) with state consent or request for consent. 
D. 
This Court should order full discovery. Full discovery would assist 
in moving the case forward to rapid resolution because relevant information 
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necessary to determining class membership has been extremely difficult or 
impossible to get, given the limited discovery allowed by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
~ Interlocutory Appeal Was Timely Filed ~ 
PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
WAS TIMELY FILED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 
DESIGNATED THE DECEMBER 22, 2006 DECERTIFICA-
TION ORDER AS "PROVISIONAL" AND "NOT FINAL" 
UNTIL THE JANUARY 23, 2007 HEARING. THE ORDER 
ARISING FROM THE JANUARY 23, 2007 HEARING WAS 
SIGNED ONFEBRUARY15,2007, AND A TIMELY PETITION 
FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL WAS FILED ON MARCH 7, 
2007. 
The State argues in its Opposition to the Interlocutory Appeal 
Petition that Plaintiffs' Petition was not timely filed, depriving the Supreme Court 
of jurisdiction to hear this matter. See State's Answer in Opposition, 04/12/07.9 
The State's main argument is that the 1/12/07 Minute Entry must be considered 
an "advisory opinion" because it was entered one day after January 11th, alleged by 
the State to be the 20th day after 12/22/06. This reflects simple miscalculation by 
the State, as its arguments ignore some of the rules for computing deadlines. 
9
 We are generally employing numeric dates because they seem to aid in 
clarity when so many dates are discussed in a short space. 
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A. A Trial Court May Revise Its Orders at Any Time. 
Rule 54(b), Utah R. Civ. P. provides that "any order or other form of 
decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the 
rights . . . is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating 
all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." Here, the 12/22/06 
Provisional Order adjudicated "fewer than all the claims" for "fewer than all the 
parties," and there had never been an entry of an order complying with the first 
sentence in Rule 54(b), i.e., directing final judgment, until the 2/15/07 Final Order. 
By the 12/22/06 Provisional Order's original language, not "all the claims" of the 
parties were decided, so the court solicited "supplemental briefs." See Fact 18. 
The trial court clearly recognized that other pending motions would 
be affected, and therefore invited "the supplemental briefs" on those issues. 
Fact 18. "The December 22nd Order should be considered provisional" until such 
time as additional motions were heard on 1/23/07. Facts 17, 20; R. 4254. It was 
well within the trial court's Rule 54(b) prerogative to allow this "revision," and it 
means that the first day for appeal of the interlocutory order arose on 2/15/07, and 
the 20th day would be March 7, 2007. With three days for mailing, the deadline 
to file the interlocutory appeal on this case would be March 10, 2007. The 
Petition herein was filed March 7, 2007, making it timely under either scenario. 
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B. Not Significant That the Trial Court Allegedly Made No 
Changes to the "Provisional" 12/22/06 Order. 
The Supreme Court's Order granting the interlocutory appeal poses 
the jurisdictional question of whether it has the right to review the 12/22/06 
Provisional Order "in light of the district court's subsequent minute entry, dated 
January 12, 2007, designating the December 22 order 'provisional', and its 
February 15, 2007 order designating the December 22 order as 'final' without 
making any modifications to it." See Supreme Court Order, 05/30/07, R. 4318. 
Appellants argue that the 2/15/07 Order did modify the 12/22/06 Provisional Order 
by stating "the December 22, 2006 Order on Motion for Decertification is now a 
Final Order." Fact 23, R. 4291, p. 3 (emphasis added). Prior to that, the 
12/22/06 Order was simply "provisional," so "[w]ith the signing of this [2/15/07] 
Order, the December 22, 2006 Order is now a final Order." Id. (parenthetical 
added). Then "provisional," now "final": that is a modification. 
Even if the 12/22/06 Order was not "modified" in some technical 
sense, that should not make any difference here. The trial court, in a timely 
manner, designated the 12/22/06 Order as "provisional" until the hearing of other 
motions. Plaintiffs' counsel reasonably relied upon that statement by the court as 
postponing the time to appeal. Equity requires that the "provisional" designation 
be respected. 
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C. No "Advisory Opinion."10 
The 1/12/07 Minute Entry cannot be considered "an advisory 
opinion." The State miscalculated the time under Rule 22(d), Utah R. App. P. See 
Fact 17. 
D. Intent That 12/22/06 Order Was "Provisional." 
The trial court itself said that "the December 22nd Order should be 
considered provisional" until the other motions were heard and decided on 
1/23/07. R. 4249, 4254. The colloquy at the 1/23/07 hearing clarified the intent 
to preserve the interlocutory appeal right. Fact 21. Accordingly, the trial court 
agreed that the December 22nd Order was "provisional" and "not... final" until the 
other related matters could be briefed and heard on January 23rd. Fact 17. 
Plaintiffs relied in good faith on the trial court's and defense counsel's 
assurance that the December 22nd Order was "provisional" and "not ... final" for 
purposes of their interlocutory appeal. It would be grossly unfair to now hold that 
this interlocutory appeal was somehow untimely filed, when counsel in good faith 
relied on defense counsel, who prepared the order, and the trial court to clarify the 
10
 This "Advisory Opinion" argument by the State is irrelevant if a trial 
court has its own interlocutory authority to change its rulings under Rule 54(b). 
Nevertheless, because the issue has been raised by the Defense, a response is made 
herein to that argument. 
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intent to preserve the interlocutory appeal right. The State should be equitably 
and judicially estopped from making a contrary argument. 
The 1/23/07 hearing resulted in an Order being entered on 2/15/07. 
R. 4291. A timely interlocutory appeal was taken from that final, interlocutory 
order, which incorporated the December 22nd Order. See Plaintiffs' Petition, 
3/07/07. 
E. Interlocutory Appeal Should be Granted Now Based on 
Principles of Equity and Tudicial Economy. 
The Decertification Order guts the Plaintiffs' class action, which is the 
main issue. To proceed to trial at the district court level on the claims of the four 
named Plaintiffs would be pointless. These four individual cases would be judged 
on the basis of an erroneous legal standard, i.e. "totality of the circumstances." 
There is absolutely nothing to be gained by that, and it would simply cause more 
delay in a very old case. All of the truly important issues in the larger case lie with 
the class, not the named class representatives. 
This case has now been appealed four times to the Utah Supreme 
Court. It surely is one of the oldest cases on the Court's docket. In order to be fair 
to the parties, and in an effort to get this case finally resolved, it is equitable and 
sensible to allow this matter to be appealed, especially in light of the fact that 
Plaintiffs' counsel did everything possible to preserve the right to appeal. 
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What more could anyone expect of Plaintiffs, when the trial court 
solicited "supplemental briefs" in the final paragraph of the 12/22/06 Provisional 
Order? Fact 18. Seeking clarification from the court by the 1/9/07 letter (Fact 19) 
was reasonable and appropriate. Should Plaintiffs have insulted the trial court and 
said "no, we don't believe you and cannot rely on your orders and therefore we are 
going to appeal anyway"? Parties should not have to practice law in such an 
extreme and outrageous way in order to protect the timing of a right to appeal. 
Counsel should be able in good faith to rely on defense counsel's good faith in 
preparing the Order (R. 4291), as well as the trial court's designation of the 
12/22/06 Order as "provisional." It is fair that this Court hear this Interlocutory 
Appeal now. 
Therefore, based on the principles of equity and judicial economy, 
this Court should allow the interlocutory appeal to go forward and hear the issue 
regarding the decertification of the class at this time. 
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POINT II 
~ Decertification Was Erroneous Under Houghton HI Standard — 
THE CLASS DECERTIFICATION ORDER WAS ERRONEOUS 
BECAUSE IT FAILED TO APPLY THIS COURTS 
HOUGHTON III STANDARD REQUIRING THE STATE TO 
PAY "ITS PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF ATTORNEY FEES IF 
THE RECIPIENT OR HIS ATTORNEY REQUESTED 
CONSENT FROM THE STATE." 
A. Summary of Problems with Decertification Order. 
Several problems are immediately apparent with the trial court's 
interpretation. First, the trial court seemingly ignores Houghton Ill's definitive 
bright-line interpretation of McCoy that the State must pay "its proportionate share 
of attorney fees if the recipient or his attorney requested consent from the State." 
Houghton IIIf H 49. It continually refers to a uMcCoy cause of action," even though 
Houghton HI substantially explains and interprets McCoy. McCoy, in the year 2000, 
dealt with the attorney fees issue fairly briefly, in about 7 paragraphs. McCoy Ml 
13-19. In contrast, 21 paragraphs in Houghton III address attorney fees in great 
detail. Houghton HI 1111 31-51. How then could the trial court simply ignore 
Houghton IIVs definitive interpretation of McCoy as requiring a proportionate fee? 
Second, the trial court fixates on the Supreme Court's "failure" to use 
the word "proportionate" in McCoy, but ignores repeated use of the word in 
Houghton III. R. 35, 39, 49. This is despite the fact that Houghton III is five years 
more recent and "the law of the case." 
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Third, the "totality of the circumstances standard" finds no support 
in McCoy or Houghton III. "Totality of circumstances" is a rather vague, indefinite 
standard. It is hard to fathom how such vagueness could devolve from Houghton 
Ill's definitive language that "in all cases where the State satisfies its lien from 
proceeds procured through the efforts of a private attorney, the State is responsible 
for its proportionate share of attorney fees," if consent was requested. Houghton III, 
11 49 (emphasis added). There is an apparent disconnect. 
Fourth, the trial court is simply dead wrong when it says that there is 
"nothing in § 26-19-7 that requires the State to pay the same percentage of 
attorney fees to the recipient as the recipient is paying to his attorney." See cited 
portion in Point 11. A. above; R. 4194, p. 21. The trial court criticizes Plaintiffs7 
repeated "attempt to connect the 'proportionate costs' section of § 26-19-7(4) to 
the attorney fees section, but the Utah Supreme Court rejected that approach in 
McCoy. 2000 UT at 11 16." See Provisional Order, R. 4194, p. 20, fn 10. To the 
contrary, however, this "approach" is exactly what the Supreme Court endorsed in 
Houghton III Houghton III U 33-35, 39. 
These points are elaborated below. 
B. Trial Court Rejects and Criticizes Houghton III. 
The trial court roundly rejected the Supreme Court's holding that the 
State is liable for its proportionate share of attorney fees on the procurement of 
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State lien reimbursement with consent. Instead, the trial court created its own 
standard of a "reasonable fee" being determined by the "totality of the 
circumstances," which is not found in either McCoy or Houghton HI. The trial court 
held: 
In other words, the standard for determining reasonable fees is a 
totality of the circumstances standard. 
[T]here is nothing in the [Houghton III] court's use of the term 
"proportionate" to suggest that they [sic] are rejecting its use of the 
term "reasonable" in McCoy or that they [sic] intend "proportionate" 
to mean the same attorney fees as paid by the recipient to his 
attorney. 
12/22/06 Provisional Order, p. 22, 27 (emphasis and parenthetical added), R. 
4215, 4220. The trial court then substantially criticized this Court's Houghton HI 
decision as "not completely consistent," as "never directly addressing] how 
attorney fees" are to be calculated, and as "not [having] used uniform language" 
when referencing attorney fees under McCoy. 12/22/06 Provisional Order, p. 28, 
R. 4221. See also, Fact 6, above. 
The comparison of the McCoy, Houghton HI and trial court holdings 
is dramatic: 
McCoy 
(proportionate) 
We therefore conclude that under subsection (4) [Utah Code Ann. 
§ 26-19-7(4)], ... the State must pay the attorney fees incurred in 
procuring the State's share of the settlement proceeds. 
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McCoy, 11 18 (emphasis and parenthetical added). 
Houghton HI 
(proportionate, interpreting McCoy 1f 18 passage above) 
[W]e return to the underpinnings of our decision in McCoy. In 
McCoy, we concluded that the State was obligated to pay a 
proportionate share of the plaintiff's attorney fees because the plaintiff 
complied with section 26-19-7 of the Medicaid lien statute. Id. 11 18. 
Accordingly, in all cases where the State satisfies its lien from 
proceeds procured through the efforts of a private attorney, the State 
is responsible for its proportionate share of attorney fees if the 
recipient or his attorney requested a consent from the State. 
Houghton III 1111 39, 49 (emphasis added). 
Decertification Order 
(rejects proportionate) 
For this reason, the Court will discuss the elements for a McCoy 
cause of action and then decide whether the class should be revised 
to conform to McCoy or should instead be decertified. ... The court 
will now review the elements that must be met under McCoy in order 
to recover attorney fees from the State. 
In McCoy, the Utah Supreme Court never used the phrase 
"proportionate" to describe the State's share of attorney fees. ... 
[T]he McCoy court uses "reasonable." 
There is nothing in § 26-19-7 that requires the State to pay the same 
percentage of attorney fees to the recipient as the recipient is paying 
to his attorney. ... In other words, the standard for determining 
reasonable attorney fees is a totality of the circumstances standard. 
[Tjhere is nothing in the [Utah Supreme] court's use of the term 
"proportionate" to suggest that they [sic] are rejecting its use of the 
term "reasonable" in McCoy or that they [sic] intend "proportionate" 
to mean the same attorney fees as paid by the recipient to his attorney. 
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R. 4194, 12/22/06-2/15/07 Decertification Order, pps. 10, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 27 
respectively (emphasis added). McCoy, W 13-19. The trial court order thus rejects 
the proportional standard set forth in McCoy and Houghton HI in favor of the newly 
created "totality of the circumstances" standard. 
C. McCoy's " Incurred in Procuring" Mandates a 
Proportionate Fee 
McCoy specifically rejects the State's arbitrary "at its discretion" 
argument with respect to attorney fees: 
Moreover, the State provides no statutory, case law, or policy basis 
for limiting awards of attorney fees to those recipients to whom the 
State, at its discretion, grants consent. We see no justification for so 
limiting the relatively broad reach of subsection (4) in the case before 
us. 
McCoy, 1f 18 (emphasis added). Instead, McCoy characterizes subsection 7(4) as 
having a "relatively broad reach." McCoy then holds that "the State must pay the 
attorney fees incurred in procuring the State's share of the settlement proceeds." 
McCoy, H 18 (emphasis added). The language "[i]ncurred in procuring" can only 
mean "proportionate." It means the same percentages incurred by the recipient in 
paying his/her attorney to recover the damages. The words "must pay the attorney 
fees" connote obligation as well as lack of discretion. What amount or percentage 
"must [the State] pay?" The answer: whatever "attorney fees [the recipient] 
incurred in procuring the State's share of the settlement proceeds." McCoy, H 18 
(emphasis and parenthetical added). In other words, the "proportionate" attorney 
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fee paid by the recipient to his/her own attorney (in almost all cases at least 33%) 
on the recipient's share would be in the same proportion as "the attorney fees 
incurred (by the recipient) in procuring the State's share." McCoy, 11 18 
(parenthetical added). 
Ironically, the trial court's opinion concedes that the above-cited 
McCoy, 11 18 "language is seemingly more consistent with the Plaintiffs' approach 
than with the Court's approach." R. 4221, p. 28. The trial court then contends 
that "no approach is going to be completely consistent with the Utah Supreme 
Court's language because the language itself is not completely consistent." Id. The 
court further criticizes the Utah Supreme Court as never having "directly addressed 
how attorney fees under McCoy should be calculated," and "not [having] used 
uniform language" when referencing an attorney fee award under McCoy. Id. 
The decision then inexplicably makes the fundamental theoretical 
error of trying to determine the appropriate attorney fee formula by reference to 
McCoy alone, but ignores the contribution of Houghton HI. R. 4222 (plaintiffs' 
approach is "inconsistent with the 'reasonable' language" in McCoy). The trial 
court holds that a McCoy "reasonable" fee is the proper standard and "that 
'reasonable attorney fees' under McCoy should be determined by examining the 
totality of the circumstances under which the recipient procured the State's 
recovery." R. 4222. The problem with using McCoy alone is that it was decided 
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in the year 2000. But Houghton III, in the year 2005, resolved any latent 
ambiguities that might have existed in McCoy. Using McCoy without Houghton III 
contributes to the trial court's fundamental misinterpretation. 
D. Houghton III "Obligates" Proportionate Attorney Fees. 
Neither McCoy not Houghton HI set forth a "totality of the 
circumstances" standard proposed by the trial court. Houghton III confirms McCoy's 
interpretation of the statutory language and "obligates" payment of "a 
proportionate share of . . . attorney fees": 
We did, however, allow McCoy to recover a proportionate share of his 
attorney fees from the State, reasoning that McCoy had "followed the 
requirements of the Act" by asking for the State's consent. 
In McCoy, we concluded that the State was obligated to pay a 
proportionate share of the plaintiffs attorney fees because the plaintiff 
complied with section 26-19- 7 of the Medicaid lien statute. We 
based this conclusion on the fact that McCoy had requested consent 
to pursue the State's claim. 
Houghton III, 1111 35, 39 (citing McCoy, 11 18) (emphasis and double emphasis 
added). After a lengthy 48-paragraph discussion of the history of the attorney fees 
issue, the McCoy case and the Medicaid Reimbursement Statute, this Court held 
unequivocally that the State was responsible for a "proportionate share of attorney 
fees" in "all cases" where "the recipient or his attorney requested consent from the 
State." See Houghton III, 11 49. The Houghton III Court then concludes, based on 
McCoy: 
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Under the general holding of McCoy, the State is obligated to pay its 
share of a recipient's private attorney fees if either (1) the State 
consents to the recipient's request to represent its interest; or (2) the 
State satisfies its lien from proceeds procured through the efforts of 
a recipient's private attorney in those cases where the recipient 
requested, hut was denied, consent. 
Houghton III, 11 51 (emphasis and double emphasis added). Thus, Houghton HI 
unmistakably interprets both the statute and McCoy to "obligate" the State to pay 
"a proportionate share of the plaintiffs attorney fees" where the State has 
"consented to the representation," or the recipient "requested consent." Houghton 
III, Hlf 38, 39, 40. The trial court's totality of the circumstances standard is 
incompatible with "obligated to pay a proportionate share," as adopted by both 
McCoy and Houghton IIL The use of the word "obligated" speaks volumes in 
characterizing the State's legal responsibility to pay a "proportionate share" of 
attorney fees.11 
It is also obvious that Houghton HI is using "proportionate share of 
attorney fees" and "fair share of attorney fees" synonymously, as it uses both terms 
in the same context in Houghton III, 11 49. The trial court's vague "totality of the 
11
 A word search of the opinion reveals that a form of the word "obligated" 
is used in this identical context 13 times, and "responsible for" is used once more 
in that same context. Houghton III, Iflf 39, 40[2], 41 [3], 42, 43[2], 44, 48[2], and 
51 ("obligated" or "obligation"), and 11 49 ("responsible"). The word 
"proportionate" is specifically used three times in conjunction with "obligation" or 
"responsibility" to pay fees. Houghton HI, Ml 39, 48 and 49. Houghton III further 
uses the word or concept of an "obligation" of the State to pay its "fair share" of 
attorney fees another three times. Houghton III, 1f1f 42, 44 and 49. 
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circumstances" text is simply incompatible with the State's non-discretionary 
"obligation" to pay a "proportionate share" of fees. This court should have no 
problem finding these three 11 51 criteria (lien rccoveiy through the efforts of 
recipient's attorney plus consent) to be the only essential requirements for class 
certification. 
Additionally, the trial courtY'totality of the circumstances" standard 
dooms the class because a multitude of disparate circumstances and criteria 
allegedly determine a "reasonable" attorney fee. R. 4200-4222, 4233-4239. 
According to the trial court, this would result in "numerous individual mini-trials 
that would defeat the desired efficiency of having a class action case." R. 4239. 
The "individual fact intensive inquiry ... makes certifying a class of Plaintiffs ... 
inappropriate." Id. Accordingly, the trial court's rejection of Houghton III and 
adoption of the erroneous "totality" standard leads directly to the decertification 
due to lack of predominance, which destroys a key class requirement. 
The restoration of the correct legal standard would in essence result 
in a mandatory finding that the class was correctly certified. This is so because if 
the State owes a proportionate share of attorney fees on its lien recovery in "all 
cases" where consent is requested, the State will always pay whatever share the 
recipient pays, which was clearly the intent in McCoy and Houghton III Thus, the 
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fee is susceptible to calculation in a mathematical formula, which is appropriate for 
class action resolution. See Section E below. 
E. Proper Construction of the Statute Mandates 
"Proportionate Share/' 
During almost all of this litigation, until the year 2005, the statute 
in effect was exactly as quoted herein.12 It mandated "proportionate share": 
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total recovery 
for attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in 
an action that is commenced with the department's written consent. 
Medical Benefits Recovery Act, Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1995), as cited in 
McCoy, 11 16 and Houghton III, 11 33 (emphasis and double emphasis added). Read 
in context with other provisions, the language of the statute requires the State to 
pay proportionate attorney fees, even without reference to McCoy or Houghton III. 
E.l. Not lust Proportionate "Costs." 
The trial court and defense counsel claim that the "proportionate" 
language in the statute applies only to an attorney's out-of-pocket costs, but not 
attorney fees. R. 3861-3862; 4212-4213. A few sentences of McCoy are 
susceptible to that erroneous interpretation, if taken out of context. See McCoy, 
12
 In 2005, the Legislature amended the statute to confirm what essentially 
was already the law, i.e., the payment of an attorney fee at 33.3% "of the 
department's total recovery," as well as "a proportionate share of the litigation 
expenses directly related to the action." Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(2)(c)(ii) 
(2005). See Fact 24. 
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H1f 16, 17. When those sentences are viewed in the context of the entire case, 
especially McCoy 11 18 as explained in Houghton III 1111 35, 39, 5 1, those sentences 
simply cannot be read as requiring anything but an assessment of a proportional fee. 
First, McCoy, 11 18 says that it applies to "fees" ("must pay the 
attorney fees incurred in procuring the State's share"). Second, Houghton III, 1111 35, 
39, 51 affirm that a "proportionate" fee is what McCoy, 11 18 means. Third, the 
Houghton III "proportionate share" holding is clearly the "law of the case" for us. 
Houghton III, 1111 49, 50, 51. Fourth, it is almost incomprehensible that the subject 
statute would provide assessment of proportionate attorney "costs," while in the 
very same sentence, require a "totality of the circumstances" standard for fee 
assessment. This would mean that the Legislature, in a short, one sentence statute, 
intended two different legal standards to apply, one standard for costs, but a 
different one for fees. That is incomprehensible. Furthermore, why would the 
Legislature be specifically concerned about out-of-pocket attorney "costs"? 
Section 26-19-7(4) represents an acknowledgment that when a 
recipient's attorney recovers the State's lien, there is always going to be a 
proportionate attorney fee owed if consent was requested. The purpose of the 
statute is obviously to protect that expectation interest, not to draw some artificial 
distinction between fees and costs. Thus, it is clear that the Legislature used the 
term "in an action" to refer to its antecedent in the statute, i.e., "recovery for 
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attorney fees." That is about exactly how one would expect a lay member of the 
Legislature to view "attorney fees," i.e., as one of the "costs of litigation." In short, 
the appropriate way to read the statute is that the State may not pay a fee "more 
than 33%," but shall pay at least its proportionate share of the attorney fees, up 
to 33%. 
E.2. Internal Structure. 
The internal structure of the statute is pretty clearly intended to set 
forth rules protecting both the State and the recipient in third party actions. 
Generally, consent is required to represent the State's interest and the State is not 
bound without that consent. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(2)(a)(b). To that end, 
the statute deals with the realities of who owes what, when the recipient's lawyer, 
who probably has the case on a 1/3 contingent fee, recovers the State's lien 
amount. It hardly seems accidental or happenstance that the statute uses virtually 
the exact language of a "33% contingent fee." 
It makes sense that Section 7 would address the benefits of securing 
consent, along with the penalties of not having it. Subsection 7(4) does exactly 
that. It assumes that consent has been requested and granted. See Subsections 7 
(1), (2), and (3). Such a litigant is then rewarded for getting consent. The reward? 
Under Subsection 7(4), the State "shall" pay a proportionate share of the attorney 
fees recipient has already paid to the attorney in order to get the recovery for the 
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State. In other words, the recipient gets a lien reduction in the same contingent 
fee percentage he/she is paying his lawyer, not to exceed 33%, as a reward for 
getting consent. 
E.3. Discretion Argument Not Logical in Context of Whole 
Statute. 
Rhetorically, does it make any sense that the Legislature would leave 
the amount of the attorney fee to the whimsical discretion of a state agency, as 
urged by the State and endorsed by the trial court? R. 4214-4215. The trial court 
suggested there are many individual factors that go into determining a "reasonable 
fee," and that the agency (ORS) is somehow equipped to make this determination. 
R. 4235-4239. Why would our Legislature ignore the ubiquitous one-third 
attorney's fee in personal injury cases? 
The Legislature would surely have considered the context of how the 
issue will arise when it drafted Subsection 7(4) in 1995. That context is 
important. After obtaining consent, the recipient, through his counsel, will 
generally sue a third party tortfeasor. At some point, there is a settlement or a 
judgment. Assume the recipient is paying his attorney a one-third contingent fee 
on the gross recovery, as is customary. See Affidavits of Colin King and Steve 
Sullivan, R. 3778-3782, 3784-3788. Thus, whatever segment of that recovery 
represents the State's Medicaid lien should bear the same proportionate share of 
the fee that the recipient has already paid to recipient's attorney. Any sensible 
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citizen-legislator would see that as eminently fair. Not surprisingly, that's exactly 
what the statute does by requiring the payment of "a proportionate share" of the 
cost of an action, but "not... more than 33%" of the total lien recovery for attorney 
fees. 
E.4. Meaning of the Condition. 
The sentence comprising Subsection 7(4) has a condition, but 
uncharacteristically begins with the condition rather than having the condition at 
the end of the sentence, as is more customary. For example, one may say "you may 
go to the store, but you may not spend more than $ 100." Normally, however, the 
limiting condition can be put at the front of the sentence without any loss of 
meaning, such as "you may not spend more than $100 when you go to the store." 
In the case of Subsection 7(4), the same is true, but putting the condition last makes 
the sentence more clear, as follows: 
The department shall pay a proportionate share of the litigation costs 
of an action that is commenced with the department's written 
consent, but shall not pay more than 33% of its total lien recovery for 
attorney fees. 
In summary, the statute must be read in the context of what the 
Legislature is trying to do. McCoy did exactly that in the year 2000, and Houghton 
HI confirmed this interpretation. The statute rewards recipients who requested 
consent with a proportionate fee reimbursement. Knowing that most attorneys 
charge a one-third fee, it is clear from the statute itself that the legislature intended 
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to impose on the State a similar proportionate fee on lien reimbursement, not to 
exceed 33%. 
F. McCoy-Houghton HI Formula Is Practical, Easy to Apply. 
The McCoy I Houghton III formula works very well, is easy to use and 
applies fairly in the everyday practice of personal injury law. It easily meets all 
Rule 23 criteria. 
Assuming the attorney fee to be 33%13 on a $30,000 settlement with 
a $10,000 Medicaid lien, the fee would be $9,900. Medicaid would be paid 
$6,700 on its $10,000 lien. The other $3,300 would go directly to the recipient, 
because the attorney has already been paid on the gross. Thus, the recipient would 
receive $13,400, with the State's contribution of $3,300 to the recipient on the 
$10,000 lien recovery. The attorney fee to the recipient stays the same, but 
$3,300 of it now comes from the Medicaid lien reimbursement. The math is as 
follows: 
With Proportionate 33% Fee Reimbursement: 
$30,000 Settlement 
-$9,900 Attorney Fee (33%) 
- $6,700 Medicaid Lien Reimbursement ($10,000 Lien minus 
33% Fee Assessed Against Lien Amount) 
$13,400 Net to Recipient 
13
 For purposes of simplicity and ease of calculation, the attorney fee on a 
personal injury claim in this Brief is assumed to be 33%, although in reality most 
are 33-1/3% or sometimes 40%. 
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The recipient is hurt when the State pays less than its proportionate fee on its lien 
reimbursement, as the following example illustrates: 
With a 20%14 Medicaid Fee Reimbursement: 
$30,000 Settlement 
- $9,900 Attorney Fee (33%) 
• $8.000 Medicaid Lien Reimbursement [$10,000 - 20% Fee] 
$12,100 Net to Recipient 
The 20% lien reimbursement shorts the recipient $1,300. Another common fee 
reimbursement was 25%, which shorts the recipient $800. 
The trial court believed the proportionate formula to be impractical, 
claiming that it would result in non-uniformity of the formula for damages. 
R. 4239. This represents a misunderstanding of personal injury law and the 
proportionate formula. Does the proportionate formula still work with other fee 
arrangements? Yes. Let us suppose for whatever reason, the attorney charged a 
15% fee in the same example above. The deduction from the lien would be 15% 
of the $10,000 lien, or $1,500. This is eminently simple and fair. Suppose the 
attorney knows the recipient in a church context and agrees to charge a flat fee of 
$2,000 on a $30,000 settlement with a $10,000 lien. The proportionate fee there 
is simply $2,000/$30,000 or 6.66%, which means that the $10,000 Medicaid lien 
would be reduced by only $666. Again, a proportionate fee formula is always a 
14
 State commonly paid a fee of 20 or 25% instead of a full proportionate 
33%. Sometimes it paid less. See Facts 8, 9. 
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simple mathematical calculation. There is no possible fee scenario does not lend 
itself to easy and quick calculation for all members of the class, because the 
formula works with any percentage fee, or even a flat fee. 
POINT III 
— Class Criteria Should Be Clearly Defined by the Court ~ 
THIS COURT SHOULD RULE UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT THE 
CLASS CRITERIA ARE 1) A STATE LIEN REIMBURSEMENT, 
2) OBTAINED BY RECIPIENT'S ATTORNEY, 3) WITH STATE 
CONSENT OR REQUEST FOR CONSENT. 
It would greatly advance the resolution of this case if this Court 
would formally set forth the criteria necessary to qualify for class status. We are 
not asking for anything novel, since the Court has already done this in Houghton HI 
when it held: 
Accordingly, in all cases where the State [1] satisfies its lien from 
proceeds procured through the efforts of a [2] private attorney, the 
State is responsible for its proportionate share of attorney fees if the 
recipient or his attorney [3] requested consent from the State. 
Houghton IIIf If 49 (parenthetical numbers and emphasis added). "All cases" means 
all potential class members qualified under the following criteria: 
a) Lien reimbursement ("the State satisfies its lien"); 
b) By a private attorney ("from proceeds procured through the 
efforts of a private attorney"); and 
c) Consent ("if the recipient or his attorney requested consent 
from the State"). 
-36-
The parenthetical criteria are taken directly from the language of Houghton HI, 1149. 
In short form, they represent the common criteria of lien reimbursement, through 
a private attorney, with a consent request. Where those common criteria are 
present, i.e., in "all cases," the State "is responsible for its proportionate share of 
attorney fees." Houghton III, 11 49. This is a very sensible ruling since those three 
criteria are all that matter. They are common to all potential class members. 
Everything else is irrelevant to class certification and the ultimate litigation of the 
issue. 
This request should not be seen as seeking an advisory opinion 
because a ruling on this matter would "have a meaningful effect on the parties." 
Houghton HI, 1f 26 (internal quotes omitted). The resolution of the this matter once 
and for all will define the parameters of this litigation as it moves forward. Each 
party will understand exactly what needs to be proved to qualify for the class. It 
will also eliminate discovery disputes because discovery can now focus on what is 
important. Therefore, it is quite proper for the Supreme Court to rule on this 
issue. 
These common class criteria are not hypothetical, and they do have 
"a bearing on the scope" of the decertification order. Id. at 11 28. The issue of the 
common class criteria definitely needs to be addressed in the course of this 
litigation because commonality is required. When this case is remanded to the trial 
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court, these suggested class criteria will determine the scope of the class, the 
qualification of individuals for class status, and the discovery on those potential 
members. 
Given the duration of this litigation, it seems prudent to have the 
issue of the class criteria brought before this Court at this time. This commonality 
issue must ultimately be resolved at some time and it will ultimately end up being 
decided by the Supreme Court anyway, so why not now? This will avoid 
additional delays and appeals, so this case can move ahead more quickly to a final 
resolution. 
The trial court conceded that the other three of the four Rule 23 class 
action requirements are met in this case. R. 4227-4228 ("the Court will assume 
that requirements three and four regarding typicality of claims and adequacy of 
representation have been met" (emphasis added)). Numerosity is also present. 
R. 4229-4230 ("the Court will assume for now that the numerosity requirement 
has been met"). 
However, the court found that "common issues" did not predominate 
because of application of the totality of circumstances standard. 12/22/06 
Provisional Order, R. 4231-4239. The court observed that "there are numerous 
other individual questions that would be involved" (R. 4237), that damages could 
not "be calculated using a mathematical formula" (R. 4239), and that this would 
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result in "numerous individual mini-trials that would defeat the desired efficiency 
of having a class action case." R. 4239. The court went on to list those 
"individual" factors that precluded commonality and thus class certification, 
including "how much investigation has been done on the case prior to the request 
[for a consent]," "the likelihood of settlement without a trial," whether or not 
liability or causation "was aggressively contested," the "complexity of the case," and 
the "experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer" for the recipient. R. 4237 
(other similar "individual inquiries" were listed). The court concluded "there is 
little question that the individual questions involved in this fact-intensive inquiry 
would predominate over the common question in this case," R. 4194, p. 44. 
However, it is clear from Houghton HI that these concerns are quite 
irrelevant if the three common factors listed above, which apply to "all cases," are 
the common class requirements. For example, if the State must pay its 
proportionate fair share of the attorney fees on a lien recovery by recipient's 
attorney with consent, and all three of those common criteria are met, what 
possible difference would it make whether or not the underlying tort litigation was 
risky or not? Or the extent of the experience level of plaintiffs counsel? Or any 
of the other criteria listed by the trial court? 12/22/06 Provisional Order, R. 4236-
7. None of those factors make any difference as to whether or not there was a lien 
recovery by recipient's attorney, with consent. In other words, since none of those 
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factors listed in the trial court's order is relevant, the class should simply be 
certified with the Houghton III, 11 49 criteria as the common issues that unite the 
class. These three common criteria are fair, easily understood and capable of 
simple, mathematical calculation. Accordingly, this class action is an ideal remedy 
for a factual dispute such as this. 
POINT IV 
~ Full Discovery Would Assist in Rapid Resolution ~ 
FULL DISCOVERY WOULD ASSIST IN MOVING THE CASE 
FORWARD TO RAPID RESOLUTION BECAUSE RELEVANT 
INFORMATION NECESSARY TO DETERMINING CLASS 
MEMBERSHIP HAS BEEN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT OR 
IMPOSSIBLE TO GET GIVEN THE LIMITED DISCOVERY 
ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
In September 2005, this Court ordered full discovery on remand. 
Houghton HI, 1111 38, 28 (not allowing factual development under the general 
holding of McCoy "would artificially and illogically restrict discovery and, 
concomitantly, the size of the potential class." Houghton III, U 38). Until "the facts 
surrounding the claims of each potential class member have been developed, it will 
be impossible for the court to assess whether they fall within the general holding 
of McCoy" Houghton III, H 38 (emphasis added). Despite this full-discovery 
admonition, the trial court instead immediately focused on decertification and 
allowed only limited discovery. 
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At the first hearing after Houghton III, on January 13, 2006, the trial 
court suggested sua sponte: 
Let me tell you where I think we are with respect to this case. There 
remains to be decided a Motion to Decertify the Class and I think 
that we need to get that decided and find out whether or not we're 
going to he proceeding as a class action before we can really proceed 
any further in this case. 
So there is, at least on the basis of the record before me, no common 
issue that would justify the case continuing as a class action but I 
want to be fully informed on that issue and rereading the briefs, the 
State's position was that there is no need for discovery for me to 
determine that the individual claims predominate over any common 
questions that may exist in this case. 
So this is how I propose to proceed. I would like the State to 
respond fully to plaintiffs' request for production of documents with 
respect to 50 claims. . . . 
R. 4337, Official Transcript 01/13/06 Hearing, pps. 1-3, prepared by Carolyn 
Erickson, CSR, on 7/19/07; R. 2013, hearing of 1/13/06 (emphasis added). 
A few months later, at the request of plaintiffs, this was expanded to 
allow discovery on all of the potential class members, but only to a severely 
limited scope. For example, counsel was prohibited from contacting the attorneys 
or the Medicaid recipients on the underlying lien. Plaintiffs were allowed only one 
deposition. Most importantly, the State was not required to specify, admit or deny 
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the existence of class criteria as to the 2,786 potential cases. Sec Official Transcript 
01/13/06 Hearing, R. 4337; R. 2162, p.4. 
Thus, before any discovery had even taken place, the focus was to be 
on potential decertification. The trial court's encouragement to file another 
motion for decertification found willing ears, and Defendants did exactly that on 
Februarv 17, 2006. R. 2087. Class decertification was confirmed as a "final order" 
on February 15, 2007, 11 years after the class was first certified. R. 4291. See also 
Facts 1 and 2. , 
The trial court has enabled the State in its repeated attempts to delay 
and limit discovery. Time and time again "the State fired up its motion machine" 
{Houghton III, H 11) and frustrated each discovery attempt with motions for a 
protective order or for summary judgment, so that no discovery was had until 
2006. R. 106, 608 and 802. Judge Quinn's 2003 ruling limiting the scope of 
discovery was appealed and this Court held that the "district court adopted an 
erroneously narrow view of our holding in McCoy " Houghton III, 1f 50. This Court 
reversed and remanded with "instructions to modify the scope of the discovery 
order consistent with this opinion." Id. Instead, the trial court allowed only 
narrow discovery focused on whether the class should be decertified. Fact 1 above; 
Official Transcript 01/13/06 Hearing, R. 4337; R. 2047, Order Re: Production of 
Documents, Confidentiality, and Briefing of Class Certification of Issues. 
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Nearly every attempt by Plaintiffs to get relevant and crucial 
information through discovery has been frustrated by the State and tolerated by 
the trial court. Plaintiffs need information, including requiring the State to specify 
for every claimant what percentage attorney fee was paid by the State, and whether 
a request for consent was made. To do this, Plaintiffs will need to take further 
depositions of ORS personnel, particularly those who worked during the 1991-
2001 period, before Brent Perry's time. Plaintiffs must not be denied permission 
to contact recipients and/or their attorneys for additional information not 
contained in the spoliated files (which permission was denied by the trial court). 
Pinpoint and targeted Requests for Admission and interrogatories wall provide this 
critical information that is necessary to establishing Plaintiffs' case and qualifying 
most of the 2786 persons, perhaps more, for class membership. Therefore, 
Plaintiffs request that this Court put an end to the curtailing of discovery and order 
full, unrestricted discovery upon remand. 
CONCLUSION 
The petition, as explained herein, was timely filed and this Court does 
have jurisdiction to review the decertification order. The trial court's decertification 
order has basically gutted the case. All that remains behind are the relatively 
minuscule claims of the four class representatives. The court's decertification order 
essentially terminates the litigation, for all practical purposes. Accordingly, at a 
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very minimum, it makes sense for this Court to reverse the Decertification Order 
and straighten out the lower court's erroneous rulings whereby the trial court 
adopted a new, nonstatutory "totality of circumstances" standard for determining 
attorney fees, rather than by a "proportionate fee" as determined in HougJiton III. 
It makes no sense to defer the decision on this case for the year or so that it will 
take to work out these underlying named class members' claims, while the trail 
grows colder on the class action which was certified about 12 years ago. 
The additional issues in Points III and IV should also be heard at this 
time. They are heavily class-related and are critical in determining the size of the 
class. Resolution of these issues will be "meaningful" in that rulings thereon will 
clear the runway of clutter and move the case forward much more rapidly. These 
issues will all have to be resolved at some point in time, and now is a good time to 
do it given the procedural posture of the case. 
As this Brief is signed, this case is a day shy of entering its thirteenth 
year of litigation (it was filed on 10/27/95). It should be a priority to avoid as 
much undue delay as possible in order to get this case resolved more quickly. The 
trial court's erroneous rulings need correction. This correction, together with the 
other pending issues, present a situation in which delay can be avoided and 
ultimate resolution of the case aided. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL HOUGHTON, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE 
OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES, THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et 
\al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
DECERTIFICATION 
Case No. 950907491 
Judge Anthony B. Quinn 
The above matter came before the Court on December 14, 2006 
for oral argument on the following four motions: Defendants' 
Renewed Motion for Decertification of Class Action Status, 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Determining Class 
Criteria, Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the January, 1996 Order 
Certifying the Class to Conform to Supreme Court Opinions, and 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Determining that 
Consent is Not Required in Certain Cases where the Request would 
be Futile or would Result in Questionable Ethical Problems for 
Counsel. All four motions are interrelated and because the 
Court's decision on Defendants' Renewed Motion for 
UM4 
Decertification will necessarily decide the other three motions, 
the Court's discussion will focus primarily on the motion for 
decertification. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This lawsuit was filed on October 27, 1995. It has been 
litigated for over 11 years and has been addressed by the Utah 
Supreme Court three times. Countless motions have been filed and 
heard and the underlying law in this case has been developed and 
refined over the years both in this case and in other cases. 
Because of the many cases the Utah Supreme Court has heard in 
this area over the past 11 years, the current lawsuit before the 
Court is drastically different than the lawsuit filed in 1995. 
A. Original Claims 
The original Complaint filed had seven causes of action, all 
of which arose out of essentially one allegation. The Plaintiffs 
alleged that Utah Code Annotated § 26-19-5(1), which gave the 
State of Utah (the "State") a priority "lien against any proceeds 
payable to the recipient by . . . [a] third party," violated a 
federal Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l), which states 
that "[n]o lien may be imposed against the property of any 
individual prior to his death on account of medical assistance 
2 
paid or to be paid on his behalf under the State plan. . ." All 
seven causes of action relied on this allegation that the Utah 
lien statute violated federal law.1 
B. Original Class Certification 
In addition to the seven causes of action, the original 
complaint also requested class certification. On January 29, 
1996, Judge Pat Brian,2 based on an unopposed motion to certify 
the matter as a class action, entered an order certifying two 
classes. Judge Brian determined that "there are questions of law 
or fact common to the classes, particularly whether or not the 
State of Utah violated federal law in asserting liens on the 
1
 The First Cause of Action was for declaratory and 
injunctive relief. The Second Cause of Action was to recover the 
money allegedly taken by the State's wrongful liens. The Third 
Cause of Action was that the State's lien process violated due 
process. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action 
were respectively for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, 
mistake, and civil rights violations based on the purportedly 
illegal liens. 
2
 Three separate judges have presided over this case since 
it was filed in 1995. Judge Brian was the original judge on the 
case. After Judge Brian's retirement in 1999, the case was 
assigned to Judge Ronald Nehring. Judge Anthony Quinn, the 
current judge on this case, was assigned to the case in 2003 
after Judge Nehring was appointed to be a Utah Supreme Court 
Justice. 
3 
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claims, settlements and judgments of class members to reimburse 
itself for Medicaid assistance paid. . . ." 
The two classes certified both involved individuals who were 
injured by the acts of a third party, became Medicaid recipients, 
had medical bills that were paid in whole or in part by the 
State, and who subsequently undertook a third party liability 
action against the third party who injured them, resulting in the 
imposition of a lien by the State. The first class of plaintiffs 
were those who did not retain counsel in pursuing their claims 
against liable third parties. The second class of plaintiffs 
were those who did retain counsel in their pursuit of liable 
third parties. 
C. Validity of Utah Medicaid Lien 
Since this case has been filed, the validity of the State's 
Medicaid lien has been addressed in a number of cases. The Utah 
Supreme Court first addressed the validity of the State's 
Medicaid liens in 1998, issuing opinions on the subject in two 
separate cases on the same day. 
In the first case, 5.S. v. State of Utah, a minor was 
severely and permanently injured when he was struck by a drunk 
driver. 972 P.2d 439, 440 (Utah 1998). The minor's father 
4 
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received Medicaid assistance on his behalf and the minor 
subsequently reached a settlement agreement against the drunk 
driver. Id. The State then asserted its statutory lien on part 
of the settlement proceeds to recover its Medicaid expenses. Id. 
The trial court refused to allow the State to recover its lien 
because, inter alia, the trial court found that the State lien 
violated the federal Medicaid statute, which prohibited liens 
against the property of an individual for medical assistance paid 
by Medicaid. Id. at 442. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court. 
Citing a New York Court of Appeals case that had recently faced 
the same issue, the Utah Supreme Court held that because the 
Medicaid recipient is required to assign to the State its right 
to recover medical expenses paid by Medicaid, the State's lien 
attaches to the liable third party's property, not to the 
Medicaid recipient's property. S.S., 972 P.2d at 442. 
Therefore, the Utah Medicaid statute did not violate the federal 
Medicaid statute because it did not give the State a lien on the 
Medicaid recipient's property. Id. 
The validity of the State's lien was also contested in 
Wallace v. Estate of Nichole Jackson, where another minor was 
5 
injured in an accident, received Medicaid assistance, and had the 
State assert its Medicaid lien on settlement proceeds recovered 
by the recipient from a third party. 972 P.2d 446, 447 (Utah 
1998). Similar to the minor in S.S., the minor contended that 
the State's Medicaid lien violated the federal Medicaid statute. 
Id. The Utah Supreme Court noted that in S.S., it had held that 
"payments made by a liable third party do not legally become the 
property of the recipient until after a valid settlement which 
must include reimbursement to the State for Medicaid benefits." 
Id. at 448. This holding in S.S. led the court to conclude in 
Wallace, as it had in S.S., that "the federal anti-lien statute 
is not violated when the State seeks reimbursement . . . "3 Id. 
These two cases ended the Plaintiffs' primary allegation that the 
State's Medicaid lien violated federal law. 
3
 The contexts of S.S. and Wallace, however, were slightly 
different. In Wallace, the State was attempting to recover its 
lien in the context of an interpleader action, rather than in 
direct litigation with the Medicaid recipient as in S.S.. 
Wallace, 972 P.2d at 447. The Utah Supreme Court, however, made 
clear that the State's right to recover its lien was not affected 
simply because an interpleader had been filed. What mattered was 
not the circumstances under which the third party proceeds were 
being held, but the fact that the State had a valid lien on the 
proceeds. Id. at 448. 
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However, while the instant case continued in litigation, the 
Utah Supreme Court decided State of Utah v. McCoy, which held 
that in certain circumstances, a Medicaid recipient could recover 
attorney fees from the State. 2000 UT 39 SI 20, 999 P.2d 572. In 
McCoy, the Medicaid recipient had complied with the Medicaid 
statute by requesting consent from the State to represent the 
State's claim against the third party. Id. at ! 3. After the 
State refused to grant consent, the Medicaid recipient excluded 
the State's claim in his recovery efforts against the third 
party. Id. at SIS! 3-4. Despite the State's denial of consent and 
the exclusion of the State's claim, once the Medicaid recipient 
had recovered against the third party, the State filed an action 
against the Medicaid recipient contending that it was entitled to 
recover its lien from the proceeds procured by the recipient. 
Id. at SI 6. 
Despite the unfairness of allowing the State to satisfy its 
lien after the Medicaid recipient had complied with the statute 
by requesting consent and excluding the State's claim, the Utah 
Supreme Court found that the Medicaid statute permitted such a 
result. McCoy, 2000 UT at SISI 11-12. However, the court also 
found that where the State satisfied its lien through the efforts 
7 
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of the Medicaid recipient's attorney, the State was responsible 
to pay the recipient reasonable attorney fees. Id. at St 18. 
Therefore, McCoy opened the door for at least some of the 
Plaintiffs in this case to continue the litigation since all of 
the Class II Plaintiffs had retained attorneys and therefore 
could potentially recover some of their attorney fees from the 
State. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court's decisions in S.S. and 
Wallace had ended the Plaintiffs' claim that the State's lien 
violated federal law, the Plaintiffs continued to litigate the 
validity of the State's lien contending that although the lien 
itself did not violate federal law, the lien's "priority" status 
did. The Utah Supreme Court rejected the Plaintiffs' argument in 
Houghton v. Dep't of Health, repeating its prior holdings that 
the State's lien was not a lien on the Medicaid recipient's 
property, but on the third party's property. 57 P. 3d 1067, 1069 
(Utah 2002) . Therefore, the "priority" status of the lien was 
irrelevant and did not violate the federal Medicaid statute.4 Id. 
4
 The Plaintiffs filed a writ of certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court, but the court declined to hear the appeal. 
Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 538 U.S. 945, 945 (2003). However, 
three years later in an unrelated case, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that federal Medicaid law prohibited a state from recovering 
8 
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As for recovery of attorney fees under McCoy, the Utah 
Supreme Court further clarified McCoy in State of Utah v. 
Streight and in a third appeal in the current case. In Streight, 
the Utah Supreme Court held that a Medicaid recipient could not 
recover attorney fees from the State unless it had requested 
consent from the State to represent the State's claim. 2004 UT 
88 St 16, 108 P. 3d 690. In other words, requesting consent was 
mandatory in order to recover any attorney fees from the State. 
The court further clarified McCoy in the current case's third 
trip to the Utah Supreme Court by holding that, unlike the 
consent requirement, a Medicaid recipient's failure to exclude 
the State's claim did not prevent the Medicaid recipient from 
recovering attorney fees. Houghton, 2005 UT 63 1 48, 125 P.3d 
860. 
an amount in excess of the recipient's recovery for medical' 
expenses. Arkansas Dep't of Health and Human Services v. 
Ahlborn, 126 S. Ct. 1752 (2006). This ruling effectively 
overruled Houghton's holding that the State of Utah could recover 
its Medicaid payments from third party settlement proceeds that 
did not represent a recovery of medical costs. In light of 
Ahlborn, the Plaintiffs filed a motion asking the Court to 
reinstate its original claims. However, because Ahlborn was not 
a direct appeal from Houghton and the issue had already been 
definitely decided by the Utah Supreme Court, the Court denied 
the motion on the basis that the Court had no authority to 
revisit the issue. 
9 
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As the above discussion shows, the legal landscape has 
changed dramatically since this case was filed and certified as a 
class action in 1995. The essential cause of action of the 
original complaint is vastly different from the current claim for 
attorney fees. After 11 years of litigation and several Utah 
Supreme Court decisions, the only viable claim left is an implied 
cause of action for attorney fees based on McCoy, decided five 
years after this litigation commenced. However, despite these 
dramatic changes, the class has never been reevaluated in light 
of the current state of the law after McCoy. For this reason, 
the Court will discuss the elements needed for a McCoy cause of 
action and then decide whether the class should be revised to 
conform to McCoy or should instead be decertified. 
II. Elements of McCoy Cause of Action 
As discussed above, the Plaintiffs' original claims have 
been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court and the only remaining 
claim left is the implied cause of action for attorney fees 
recognized in McCoy. The Court will now review the elements that 
must be met under McCoy in order to recover attorney fees from 
the State. 
10 
/ \~?r\-2-
A. Plaintiffs' Prima Facie Case Under McCoy 
In order to recover attorney fees from the State, each 
Plaintiff must show the following: (1) the Plaintiff was 
represented by counsel in a third party liability claim, (2) the 
Plaintiff requested consent from the State to represent the 
State's Medicaid claim, (3) the State satisfied its Medicaid lien 
from proceeds recovered through the efforts of the Plaintiff, and 
(4) the State did not pay the reasonable attorney fees it was 
obligated to pay the Plaintiff. Each of these elements will be 
discussed in turn. 
1. Represented by Counsel 
Both the Plaintiffs and the State agree that in order to 
recover under McCoy, the Medicaid recipient must have been 
represented by counsel in a third party liability claim. All 
that a Plaintiff must show under this element is that the 
recipient was represented by counsel at the time the lien was 
paid. 
2. Request for Consent 
The second element of a McCoy cause of action is that the 
Plaintiff must have requested consent from the State to represent 
the State's Medicaid claim. Although the Plaintiffs generally 
11 
acknowledge the consent requirement, the Plaintiffs ask this 
Court to find that where a request for consent would have been 
futile because of purported State policies, the consent 
requirement should be "relaxed." However, there is nothing in 
the statute or case law that justifies relaxing the McCoy consent 
requirement. Utah Code Annotated § 26-19-7(1)(a) expressly 
states that, 
A recipient may not file a claim, commence an action, 
or settle, compromise, release, or waive a claim 
against a third party for recovery of medical costs 
for an injury, disease, or disability for which the 
department has provided or has become obligated to 
provide medical assistance, without the department's 
written consent. (1995) (emphasis added). 
This statutory language requiring consent5 is mandatory and 
provides no "futility" exception or any other exception. 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals have repeatedly stated that a request for consent is a 
prerequisite to recovering attorney fees from the State. See 
Camp v. Office of Recovery Services, 779 P.2d 242, 248 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) ("Although subsection 26-19-7(4) may authorize an 
award of attorney fees to some Medicaid recipients, the fees must 
5
 Of course, in order to obtain consent, one must first 
request consent, which is the requirement at issue here. 
12 
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be in connection with the commencement of an action, and the 
action must be commenced with the State's written consent.") 
(emphasis added); McCoy, 2000 UT at 1 14 ("Thus, under [§ 26-19-
7(1)(a)], a recipient must seek the State's consent before 
attempting to recover from a third party . . .") (emphasis 
added)/ Houghton, 2005 UT at 11 39-40 ("In McCoy, we concluded 
that the State was obligated to pay a proportionate share of the 
plaintiff's attorney fees because the plaintiff complied with 
section 2 6-19-7 . . . . We based this conclusion on the fact that 
McCoy had requested consent to pursue the State's claim. . . . 
Where Medicaid recipients failed to comply with the statute, they 
were not entitled to a contribution from the State for their 
attorney fees.") (emphasis added). 
Indeed, the need for the Medicaid recipient to request 
consent before recovering any attorney fees from the State was 
directly at issue in Streight. In Streight, the issue before the 
court was whether the Medicaid recipient could recover some of 
his attorney fees from the State even though the recipient had 
not requested the State's consent prior to settling with the 
liable third party. Streight, 2004 UT at 1 1. The recipient 
argued that he was entitled to attorney fees because the Medicaid 
13 
statute did not explicitly provide that forfeiture of attorney 
fees was the consequence of not requesting the State's consent. 
Id. at 5 13. 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument, however, and 
after noting that the plain terms of the statute did not address 
any affirmative obligation on the State to pay attorney fees, and 
explained that 
In McCoy, on grounds of fairness, we interpreted the 
statute to imply an obligation on the part of the 
State to pay fees where the attorney acted in 
compliance with the statute, requesting consent to 
pursue an action and then preserving the State's 
independent right to recover by excluding the State's 
claim from any action filed on behalf of the injured 
party. In doing so, McCoy struck a balance between 
the State's interest in protecting itself from 
collusive efforts to place otherwise reimbursable 
funds beyond its reach and the interest of private 
attorneys in being compensated for obtaining 
recoveries benefitting the State. This balance would 
be upset were we to extend McCoy to situations where 
a Medicaid recipient's private attorney does not 
bother to seek the State's consent to his or her 
action. Id. at SI 13 (emphasis added) . 
In order to avoid upsetting the balance established by 
McCoy, the Utah Supreme Court in Streight declined "to extend the 
State's contingent obligation to pay attorney fees . . . to cases 
where attorneys fail to seek the State's consent to actions 
14 
seeking recovery of Medicaid recipients' medical costs." Id. at 
SI 16 (emphasis added) . 
In light of the Utah Supreme Court's clear holding that 
request for the State's consent is a prerequisite to recovering 
attorney fees, this Court declines to "relax" the statutory 
request requirement and recognize a "futility" exception. The 
statute plainly requires the recipient to seek consent from the 
State. If any Plaintiff chose to ignore the statutory 
requirements of § 26-19-7 because the Plaintiff felt the request 
would have been "futile/' he did so at his own peril. Therefore, 
a Plaintiff must show that he or she requested consent from the 
State to recover attorney fees under McCoy.6 
3. Satisfaction of Lien through Counsel's Efforts 
The third element a Plaintiff must show in order to recover 
attorney fees is that the State satisfied its lien from proceeds 
procured through the Plaintiff's efforts. See Houghton, 2005 UT 
6
 The Plaintiffs also argue that the retainer agreements 
were unethical and therefore the Plaintiffs contend that refusing 
to sign these agreements should excuse the failure to obtain 
consent. However, the prerequisite to obtaining attorney fees is 
not obtaining consent, but simply requesting consent. If the 
recipient's attorney requested consent, but was unable to obtain 
consent because he refused to sign what he felt was an unethical 
agreement, the recipient is still entitled to attorney fees in 
that case because consent was requested. 
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at 1 49 ("Accordingly, in all cases where the State satisfies its 
lien from proceeds procured through the efforts of a private 
attorney, the State is responsible for its proportionate share of 
attorney fees . . . " ) . Neither the State nor the Plaintiffs 
dispute this element, but it should be noted that the Plaintiff's 
burden on this element is light. The Plaintiff need only show 
that it was represented by counsel at the time it obtained a 
recovery from the third party to meet its burden. If the 
represented Plaintiff can show he obtained a third party 
recovery, the presumption will be that the State satisfied its 
lien from proceeds procured through the Plaintiff's efforts. See 
Houghton, 2005 UT at 1 49 ("moreover, in those cases where a 
settlement or judgment is obtained through the efforts of a 
private attorney, any claim by the State that it recovered its 
lien through its own efforts will be subject to scrutiny."). As 
discussed further below, the State will then have the burden to 
show that it satisfied its lien through its own efforts and not 
the recipient's efforts. 
4. Payment of Reasonable Attorney Fees 
The fourth element a Plaintiff must show is that the State 
failed to pay the reasonable attorney fees the State owed the 
16 
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Plaintiff for procuring the State's recovery. This element 
necessarily involves deciding how a reasonable fee is determined. 
The method of determining a reasonable fee is the primary dispute 
between the parties. The Plaintiffs contend that the State is 
required to pay the same percentage of attorney fees on its lien 
reimbursement that the recipient paid to his own attorney. The 
Plaintiffs seek a presumption that this is 33%.7 The State 
counters that the determination of attorney fees is a fact 
intensive inquiry rather than a simple across the board 33%. 
In order to resolve this dispute, it is important to examine 
the basis for allowing a recipient to recover attorney fees from 
the State. Examining § 26-19-7, there is clearly no express 
requirement for the State to pay attorney fees. See Streight, 
2004 UT at % 13 ("the plain terms of [§ 26-19-7] do not address 
7
 Despite Plaintiffs' contention, it is this Court's 
experience in reviewing minor settlements that the percentage for 
attorney fees in personal injury claims are often less than 33%. 
The Court has seen numerous cases where the percentage is 25% or 
some other percentage than 33%, including cases involving the law 
firms of the individuals who have filed affidavits stating that 
the standard contingency fee is 33%. Moreover, even when the 
agreed percentage is 33%, it often happens where the case will 
settle and the recipient will pay less than the 33% agreed 
amount. Therefore, Plaintiffs' contention that 33% is almost 
always the percentage paid by the recipient does not excuse proof 
of the actual percentage in each case as a factor in determining 
the reasonable fee. 
17 
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any affirmative obligation on the part of the State to pay 
attorney fees.") However, in McCoy, the Utah Supreme Court faced 
a circumstance where a Medicaid recipient had complied with the 
statute in every way, was denied consent by the State to 
represent it, and then had the State reimburse itself from the 
recipient attorney's third party recovery after the recipient had 
excluded the State's lien. 2000 UT at 5? 2-6. 
Confronted by such a circumstance, the Utah Supreme Court 
later explained that "[i]n McCoy, on grounds of fairness, we 
interpreted the statute to imply an obligation on the part of the 
State to pay fees where the attorney acted in compliance with the 
statute, requesting consent to pursue an action and then 
preserving the State's independent right to recover by excluding 
the State's claim from any action filed on behalf of the injured 
party."8 Streight, 2004 UT at 1 13. Therefore, the obligation to 
pay attorney fees is not from any affirmative requirement in ths 
The Utah Supreme Court later clarified that excluding the 
State's lien was not a prerequisite to recovering attorney fees. 
See Houghton, 2005 UT at % 48 ("We accordingly hold that the 
State's obligation to pay its share of attorney fees is not 
dependent upon whether the recipient expressly excluded the 
State's claim . . .") . 
18 
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statute, but from an implied obligation read into the statute by 
the McCoy court. 
In its most recent pronouncement on the subject, the Utah 
Supreme Court declared that McCoy's ruling requiring the State to 
pay attorney fees was based in equity.9 See Houghton, 2005 UT at 
1 43 (noting that barring recovery of attorney fees where the 
recipient did not exclude the State's claim would "defeat the 
equitable basis for our ruling in McCoy") . Therefore it is 
important to note that requiring the State to pay attorney fees 
where it denied consent should be viewed as an equitable 
interpretation of § 26-19-7 rather than as an express requirement 
of it. 
In this light, the Court will examine what the Utah Supreme 
Court has stated regarding the State's obligation to pay attorney 
fees. In McCoy, the Utah Supreme Court never used the phrase 
"proportionate" to describe the State's share of attorney fees. 
Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court carefully divided § 26-19-7(4) and 
held that the "proportionate share" language in the statute 
9
 As used here, the term equity is not used in the sense of 
a law/equity dichotomy, but as a synonym for fairness. 
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referred only to costs, not attorney fees.10 McCoy, 2000 UT at 1 
16. 
Instead, the McCoy court referred to the State's obligation 
to pay "reasonable" attorney fees. 2000 UT at 11 19-20. The 
court explained that under § 26-19-7, no matter what avenue the 
State chooses to recover its lien, the State is responsible for 
paying reasonable attorney fees. The court stated: 
The State may (1) take action directly against the 
third party, for which the State pays its own expenses; 
(2) grant consent to recipients seeking to pursue the 
State's claim, whereby the State's recovery will be 
reduced by reasonable attorney fees and, if any, its 
proportionate share of the costs of an action; or (3) 
refuse consent and proceed against the recipient after 
the recipient recovers from the third party, in which 
case the State's recovery shall be reduced by 
reasonable attorney fees. McCoy, 2000 UT at 1 19 
(emphasis added). 
Notably, under the second option, the McCoy court uses 
"reasonable" to refer to the attorney fees and "proportionate" to 
refer to the costs. This is consistent with the court's 
separation of the attorney fees section from the "proportionate" 
costs section under the statute. Id. at SI 16. 
The Plaintiffs repeatedly attempt to connect the 
"proportionate costs" section of § 26-19-7(4) to the attorney 
fees section, but the Utah Supreme Court rejected this approach 
in McCoy. 2000 UT at If 16. 
20 
/ 1-9- I 
Also notable is that whether the State grants consent under 
the second option or denies consent under the third option, in 
both cases, it is obligated to pay "reasonable" attorney fees. 
In other words, the State should pay fees that meet the standard 
of reasonableness of attorney fees regardless of whether it 
grants or denies consent. Based on this, the process to 
determine the State's attorney fees when it denies consent should 
be the same process that is used to determine the State's 
attorney fees when it grants consent. 
The process for determining attorney fees when consent is 
given can be gleaned from § 26-19-7. Essentially, § 26-19-7(3)-
(4) states that where the State gives consent, it must state the 
terms of the consent. However, the statute limits the discretion 
of the State in stating the terms of its consent by prohibiting 
the State from paying more than 33% of its recovery in attorney 
fees. There is nothing in § 26-19-7 that requires the State to 
pay the same percentage of attorney fees to the recipient as the 
recipient is paying to his attorney. Indeed, if the standard fee 
is 331/3%, the statute prevents the state from paying the 1/3%. The 
statute instead presumes that once the recipient requests 
consent, the State will examine the circumstances of the Medicaid 
21 
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recipient's claim against the third party and determine a 
reasonable attorney fee that should be paid.11 
In other words, the standard for determining reasonable fees 
is a totality of the circumstances standard. However, there are 
two factors that are of paramount importance in determining 
reasonable attorney's fees: (1) the fee arrangement between the 
recipient and his counsel; and (2) the case status at the time 
consent was requested. 
The first important factor is the fee arrangement 
recipient's counsel agreed to accept to prosecute the claim 
against the third party tort-feasor. Where a lawyer and a client 
have agreed to a particular arrangement, that arrangement is 
strong evidence of what constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee 
in the case. 
In the vast majority of cases, the fee arrangement will be a 
contingency fee agreement based upon the entire recovery, 
including the lien amount. In those cases, the agreed percentage 
11
 Of course, the determination by the State must be 
reasonable and made in good faith. Although the plain language 
of § 26-19-7 (3) might support an argument that the State can 
require any terms it chooses, even unreasonable ones, McCoy is 
clear that the attorney fees must be "reasonable," even where the 
State is entitled under § 26-19-7(3) to state the terms of its 
consent. 2000 UT at ^  19. 
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is presumptively reasonable based on what was known about the 
case when the agreement was reached. In some cases, the fee 
arrangement may be a contingency percentage based upon the net 
recovery to the recipient, excluding the lien amount. Any such 
case would not be part of the proposed class, because the lawyer 
and. not the recipient would be the proper party in interest. In 
some cases, the fee contract between the lawyer and the recipient 
may call for some other basis of computing the fee, such as an 
hourly rate or fixed fee. In these cases, the Court would have 
to examine the fee arrangement and determine the State's fair 
share based upon a totality of the circumstances. 
The second factor is the case status at the time the 
recipient requests consent. If the recipient requests consent 
near the beginning of the case when the status is the same as 
when the fee percentage was set, the percentage of attorney fees 
owed by the State would likely be the same. However, if the 
recipient requests consent after investigations have been 
completed and the merits of the case are more clear, the State's 
attorney fees may be lower if in fact the risk of non recovery is 
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less.12 For example, as was often the case, if the recipient 
requested consent from the State after the recipient received an 
acceptable settlement offer from the third party, the State's 
attorney fees would be less because there was little risk of not 
recovering.13 
12
 Of course in some cases, investigation will show a higher 
risk of non recovery. However, because the attorney and the 
recipient presumably accounted for the risk that further 
investigation would show a higher risk of non recovery when they 
negotiated the percentage for attorney fees, the State will never 
be required to pay a higher percentage of attorney fees than the 
recipient paid. In other words, the percentage of attorney fees 
the recipient paid will act as a ceiling on the percentage of 
attorney fees the State must pay. 
13
 This Court recognizes that where the recipient's attorney 
has done a substantial amount of work prior to requesting 
consent, the State arguably gets a free ride up to that point 
since the State's attorney fee will likely be lower under those 
circumstances. However, the State should not be punished where 
the recipient knows of his claim, but waits to inform the State. 
The clock on the State's obligation to pay fees should not begin 
to run until the State is put to the choice of deciding which of 
its collection options to choose. Section 26-19-7 clearly 
contemplates the recipient requesting consent from the State as 
soon as possible. To the extent the recipient chooses to wait to 
complete his statutory obligations, that choice should weigh on 
the recipient, not the State. This result is consistent with 
Streight's holding that if the recipient does not seek the 
State's consent until after the claim has been settled or 
resolved, the State is not obligated to pay any attorney fees to 
the recipient, despite the apparent free ride to the State. See 
Streight, 2004 UT at 1 14 ("attorneys filing cases on behalf of 
Medicaid recipients may avoid the injustice of working to obtain 
a recovery without being paid simply by complying with the 
provisions of [§ 2 6 - 1 9 - 7 ] . . . " 
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As a result, where the recipient makes his request in close 
proximity to when the recipient and his attorney entered into a 
fee agreement, a presumption will arise that the State's 
percentage of fees are the same percentage as the recipient's 
fees. However, it is likely that in most cases, there is a 
sufficient difference between the time the attorney is retained 
and the time the consent is requested that the presumption that 
the attorney fees are proportionate to the recipient's fees will 
not arise, thus requiring a more fact intensive inquiry.14 
In light of this, this Court cannot accept Plaintiffs' 
contention that the attorney fees will always be the same 
percentage as the recipient's attorney fees. As the above 
discussion shows, to the degree that there is less risk of non 
recovery compared to when the recipient signed the retainer 
agreement, the State's attorney fee may correspondingly be less. 
Therefore, reasonable attorney fees under McCoy cannot simply 
mean whatever percentage of fees the recipient agreed to pay his 
attorney. 
14
 The resulting range in the percentage of attorney fees 
owed by the State will be somewhere between 20% to 33%. Notably, 
this is the same range of percentages that were employed where 
the State granted consent and entered into a fee agreement with 
the recipient. 
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This rejection of Plaintiffs' argument accords with McCoy 
itself. The McCoy court concluded that "[w]e affirm the judgment 
of the trial court to the extent it held that the State is 
entitled to recover $8,846.92 from McCoy, but reverse to the 
extent the court failed to reduce the State's recovery by McCoy's 
reasonable attorney fees for procuring the State's share of the 
settlement proceeds." McCoy, 2000 UT at 1 20. As this statement 
reveals, the McCoy court knew the exact amount of the State lien 
at issue. If the McCoy court intended that the State's attorney 
fees should simply be 33%, it would have been easy to so indicate 
and even determine the precise amount the State owed in attorney 
fees. 
Instead, the court remanded it to the district court for a 
determination of "reasonable" attorney fees. This Court knows of 
no case where "reasonable attorney fees" refers to a simple 
mathematical percentage. The court's remand action and use of 
the word "reasonable" suggests instead that the court had a more 
fact intensive inquiry in mind that had to be undertaken by the 
trial court. 
Nothing in the Utah Supreme Court's later cases or in the 
Plaintiffs' memoranda convinces this Court otherwise. The 
26 
/I-7 I/O 
Plaintiffs make much of the fact that the Utah Supreme Court 
later uses the term "proportionate" in Houghton. 2005 UT at ff 
39, 49. However, there is nothing in the court's use of the term 
"proportionate" to suggest that they are rejecting its use of the 
term "reasonable" in McCoy or that they intend "proportionate" to 
mean the same attorney fees as paid by the recipient to his 
attorney. Indeed, the Houghton court also refers to the State's 
obligation to pay its "fair share" of attorney fees, which is 
more reminiscent of the "reasonable" language from McCoy. Id. at 
1 40. 
The Plaintiffs also spend a large amount of their brief 
contending that, under McCoy and Houghton, the State has no 
discretion in deciding whether to pay 33% in attorney fees. 
While the Plaintiffs are correct that the State has no discretion 
in whether to pay attorney fees, neither McCoy or Houghton held 
that the State must pay the same percentage of attorney fees as 
does the recipient. The State's attempt to bootstrap a 33% 
attorney fee requirement on to the Utah Supreme Court's holding 
that the State must pay reasonable attorney fees is an 
unsupported logical leap. 
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Finally, the Plaintiffs focus a great deal on McCoy's 
language that "the State must pay the attorney fees incurred in 
procuring the State's share of the settlement proceeds.7' 2000 UT 
at 1 18 (emphasis added). Admittedly, this language is seemingly 
more consistent with the Plaintiffs' approach than with the 
Court's approach. Ultimately, however, neither the Court's 
approach nor the Plaintiffs' approach is completely consistent 
with the various phrases used in McCoy and subsequent cases. 
Indeed, no approach is going to be completely consistent with the 
Utah Supreme Court's language because the language itself is not 
completely consistent.15 This is likely because the Utah Supreme 
Court has never directly addressed how attorney fees under McCoy 
should be calculated. In light of this fact, it should not be 
surprising that the court has not used uniform language when 
referencing an award of attorney fees under McCoy. 
Hence, although the Court's approach may not fit perfectly 
with all the Utah Supreme Court's language, it is still 
15
 This can clearly be seen by the fact that the State 
emphasizes the McCoy court's language of "reasonable" attorney 
fees while the Plaintiffs focus on the Houghton court's language 
of "proportionate" attorney fees. While "reasonable" and 
"proportionate" are not irreconcilable, they also cannot be said 
to be synonomous and there is an inherent tension between the 
two. 
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preferable to the Plaintiffs' approach because the Plaintiffs' 
approach is not only inconsistent with the "reasonable" language, 
but it is also inconsistent with the theoretical framework of the 
McCoy decision and with the plain language of § 26-19-7. Given 
that the Utah Supreme Court has simply not yet explained how 
attorney fees should be calculated, this Court has adopted the 
approach that seems most consistent with § 26-19-7, with the 
circumstances of the McCoy holding, and with the Utah Supreme 
Court's direction on the subject. Therefore, for the above 
reasons, this Court finds that "reasonable attorney fees" under 
McCoy should be determined by examining the totality of the 
circumstances under which the recipient procured the State's 
recovery focusing on the percentage the recipient agreed to pay 
and when the recipient first requested consent. 
Hence, to meet the fourth element in a McCoy cause of the 
action, the Plaintiff must show that the State did not pay the 
full amount of reasonable attorney fees it owed to the recipient 
using the above totality of the circumstances standard. If the 
Plaintiff meets his burden to show each of the above four 
elements, he will have made a prima facie case for recovery of 
attorney fees under McCoy. 
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B. Defenses by the State 
If the Plaintiff successfully makes out a prima facie case 
for attorney fees by showing the above four elements, the burden 
will then shift to the State to show any applicable defenses. 
The Utah Supreme Court has identified two potential defenses that 
the State may use to avoid paying attorney fees: (1) the State 
can show that it satisfied its lien through its own efforts, or 
(2) the State can show it was prevented from collecting against 
the third party because of the Plaintiff's lack of cooperation. 
A successful showing of either of these defenses means the State 
is not liable for any attorney fees to the recipient. 
1. State Procured its Own Lien 
As discussed previously, if the Plaintiff procured a 
recovery from the third party, the presumption will be that the 
Plaintiff procured the State's recovery. In order to overcome 
this presumption, the State must show that it satisfied its lien 
through proceeds procured through its own efforts and not through 
the Plaintiff's efforts. However, 
[t]he State will not be able to establish that it 
recovered its lien through its own efforts simply 
by showing that it sent notification of its lien to 
potentially liable third parties with the 
expectation that they will pay the State directly 
from the settlement proceeds generated through the 
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efforts of a recipient's private attorney. To 
avoid paying its fair share of attorney fees after 
it has refused to grant consent, the State must 
demonstrate that its lien was paid wholly 
independent of the settlement or judgment procured 
by the recipient's private attorney. 
Houghton, 2005 at SI 49. However, where the State successfully 
shows that its lien was paid "wholly independent" of the 
Plaintiff's efforts, the State will not be liable for any 
attorney fees. 
2. Lack of Cooperation 
The second potential defense is where the State can show the 
recipient's lack of cooperation prevented the State from 
recovering. In McCoy, the State of Utah had argued that the 
Medicaid recipient was not entitled to attorney fees because he 
had failed to cooperate with the State. 2000 UT at 518 n.4. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that "a recipient 
has a duty to cooperate with the State in identifying and 
providing information to assist the State in pursuing" liable 
third parties, the court found that in McCoy's case, the lack of 
cooperation did not prejudice the State's claim against the third 
party. Id. Therefore, the court concluded that it did not need 
to address "whether the legislature intended not to award 
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attorney fees to a recipient whose ^failure to cooperate' 
prevents the State from recovering from a third party." Id. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court did not determine whether a 
recipient's failure to cooperate could provide a defense to the 
State, this Court believes that such a defense should be 
available. Where the recipient's lack of cooperation prevents 
the State from having the opportunity to pursue its lien against 
the third party, the Medicaid statute has been frustrated. 
In Streight, the court found that not requiring the 
recipient to request consent would prejudice the State because 
the State would "[lose] its ability to choose the most efficient 
vehicle for its recovery." 2004 UT at SI 12. Just as failure to 
request consent from the State robs the State of its ability to 
choose its avenue of recovery, a recipient's lack of cooperation 
can produce the same result. If the lack of cooperation hinders 
the State from pursuing its own recovery, then its option of 
pursuing its own recovery has been taken away. Therefore, if the 
State can show that a Plaintiff's lack of cooperation prevented 
it from pursuing its own recovery, the State will not be liable 
for any attorney fees to the Plaintiff. 
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III. Application of Rule 23 
Now that the elements of a McCoy cause of action have been 
reviewed, the Court can now determine whether this matter should 
continue as a class action or instead should be decertified. The 
current class includes all those Medicaid recipients who were 
represented by counsel, who recovered against liable third 
parties, and who had the State satisfy its lien from the 
recipient's third party proceeds. The question now is whether to 
certify a smaller class in light of McCoy or whether to simply 
decertify the entire class. The answer depends on whether a 
smaller class based on McCoy would satisfy the Rule 23 class 
certification requirements. If the new class would not satisfy 
Rule 23, then no new classes should be certified and the current 
class should be decertified. 
As an initial matter, Courts uniformly hold that a class 
action may be decertified if it no longer meets the criteria for 
class action. See, e.g. Miera v. First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A., 925 F.2d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that Rule 
23(c) (1) allows for decertification any time before a decision on 
the merits). 
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Moreover, whether to certify or decertify a class is within 
the sound discretion of the trial court. See Richardson v. Ariz. 
Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1980) ("If the criteria of 
Rule 23 are complied with, it is within the sound discretion of 
the district court to determine whether a suit, or some of the 
issues in a lawsuit, should proceed as a class action."); Call v. 
City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986) ("We will 
reverse a trial court's decision on class action status only when 
it is shown that the trial court misapplied the law or abused its 
discretion"); Miera, 925 F.2d at 1242 ("The abuse of discretion 
standard applies not only to an initial determination to certify 
a class, but also to a subsequent determination to decertify."). 
Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure lays out the 
requirements for continued class certification. It states: 
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) 
the class so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or 
fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses 
of the representative parties are typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class. 
Of these four requirements, only the first two are disputed 
between the parties. Therefore, the Court will assume that 
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requirements three and four regarding typicality of claims and 
adequacy of representation have been met. 
In addition to Rule 23(a), in order to maintain class 
status, the Plaintiffs must also qualify under Rule 23(b) (1), 
(b)(2), or (b)(3). Both the Plaintiffs and the State agree that 
if the class is to continue, it must be under Rule 23(b)(3), 
which requires that "the questions of law or fact common to the 
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual members . . . " ) . The Court will now determine 
whether the relevant requirements for continued class 
certification have been met. 
A. Numerosity 
In order to maintain class certification under Rule 
23(a)(1), the class must be so numerous that joinder of all 
members would be impractical. There is no set number that meets 
the numerosity requirement. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the N.W., Inc. 
v. EOEC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980) ("The numerosity requirement 
requires examination of the specific facts of each case and 
imposes no absolute limitations.") While most jurisdictions 
resist having a set number, many jurisdictions nevertheless hold 
that fewer than 20 is inadequate and more than 40 is adequate. 
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See, e.g. Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th 
Cir. 1986) ("while there is no fixed numerosity rule, generally 
less than twenty-one is inadequate, more than forty adequate, 
with numbers between varying according to other factors.") 
(quotations omitted). In Utah, the general rule is that the 
"size of the class is not solely determinative of 
impracticability." Call, 727 P.2d at 183. 
It is still unclear in this case what the size of the class 
would be. According to the State's review of 411 cases, only 28 
cases would qualify as members of the class.16 However, not all 
potential cases have been viewed and therefore, even if the State 
is correct about the 28 cases, there will likely be other cases 
discovered. 
In any case, it is clear that even in the State's 
estimation, there are not so few cases that numerosity is clearly 
not met. On the other hand, it is also clear that there are not 
so many cases that size alone would determine that numerosity is 
satisfied. Instead, it appears that the numerosity will not be 
16
 Of course, the State did not have the benefit of knowing 
the Court's approach in determining attorney fees when it 
reviewed the cases. The State's approach was likely more 
stringent than the Court's approach and so there are probably 
more than 28 cases that would qualify. 
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determined by the size of the class alone, but on other factors 
in addition to size. These factors will be dealt with in 
deciding whether common questions predominate over individual 
issues. Therefore, because numerosity will turn not on the size 
of the class, but on other factors, the Court will assume for now 
that the numerosity requirement has been met. 
B. Common Questions of Law or Fact 
The second requirement for continued class action is that 
there must be questions of law or fact common to the class. 
Although the rule refers to "questions" in the plural, most 
courts find that only one question is required. See, e.g. 
Arenson v. Whitehall Convalescent & Nursing Home, Inc., 164 
F.R.D. 659, 663 (N.D. 111. 1996) (commonality requirement is 
satisfied if plaintiffs demonstrate that there is at least one 
common question of law or fact). Because of this, most courts 
find that the commonality requirement is easily satisfied. See 
Baby Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(commonality requirement is not demanding because requirement may 
be satisfied by a single common issue). 
In any case, because the Plaintiffs in this case must show 
that the common questions of law or fact predominate over 
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individual issues, then the commonality requirement will 
necessarily be decided in the predominate section below. If the 
Plaintiffs meet the predominate requirement, they will also meet 
the commonality requirement. On the other hand, if the 
Plaintiffs do not meet the predominate requirement, then the 
class should be decertified regardless of whether they meet the 
commonality requirement. 
C. The Predominance Requirement 
The final and most heavily disputed requirement for 
continued class certification is that "the questions of law or 
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members . . ." UTAH R. CIV. P. 
23(b)(3). In order for class certification to continue, the 
Plaintiffs must show that the common questions of the class 
predominate over any individual questions. 
The common questions in this matter are the legal questions 
that define the McCoy cause of action. With the exception of how 
to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees the State 
must pay, all the relevant legal questions have been resolved by 
the Utah Supreme Court in other cases. Therefore, how attorney 
fees should be determined is essentially the only common question 
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that remains among the class. In order to determine whether the 
common question of how to calculate attorney fees predominates, 
the Court must next identify the individual questions that are 
not common to the class. 
The first issue over which there are individual 
determinations to be made is the issue of whether the recipient 
was represented by counsel. In the vast majority of cases, this 
will be a simple determination. There are, however, at least a 
few cases where a recipient was initially represented by counsel, 
but where the counsel had withdrawn prior to the time settlement 
was reached. Whether these cases are addressed under the element 
of representation by counsel or under the element of whether the 
settlement was procured as a result of the attorney's efforts, 
some case specific evidence would need to be considered in these 
cases to determine whether an attorney's fee is owed. 
The second issue represents individual questions as to 
whether consent was requested. Based upon the Affidavits that 
have been submitted to the Court analyzing the claims files, the 
parties have come up with grossly disparate estimates of the 
number of cases in which consent was requested. It appears, 
therefore, that for at least some cases, the Court will have to 
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consider evidence and make a factual determination about whether 
consent was requested. 
The third and most important individual question relates to 
the determination of attorney fees.17 In examining this issue, it 
will be helpful to divide the class into two different groups. 
The first group contains those claims where the State never paid 
any attorney fees or discounted its lien, usually because the 
State denied consent. The second group contains those claims 
where the State granted consent and accordingly paid some 
attorney fees or discounted its lien.18 These two groups are 
17
 In order to avoid confusion, it should be noted that while 
the question of what process should be used to determine the 
amount of attorney fees is a question common to the class, the 
application of that process involves individual questions. For 
example, the Plaintiffs' answer to the question of what process 
should be used is that the State should pay the same percentage 
of attorney fees as the recipient pays to his attorney, with a 
presumption that this percentage is 33%. This answer is 
applicable to all members of the class. However, the question of 
what particular percentage an individual recipient paid his 
attorney is an individual inquiry not common to the class. 
18
 The critical component of this second group is not whether 
the State granted consent, but whether the State paid any 
attorney fees or discounted its lien. If the State denied 
consent, but nevertheless discounted its lien or paid some 
attorney fees, this circumstance would fall within the second 
group. Conversely, a circumstance where the State granted 
consent, but never paid any fees or discounted its lien would 
fall within the first group. Therefore, although whether consent 
was given or denied does not determine what group a Plaintiff is 
40 
i i 
important because the Plaintiffs fitting within the second group 
face additional individual inquiries in addition to those found 
in the first group. Each of these groups will be discussed in 
turn. 
1. Cases where Consent was Denied or No Attorney Fees 
were Paid. 
The first group involves those Plaintiffs who received no 
attorney fees or discount from the State. The individual 
questions involving these Plaintiffs are primarily questions as 
to the amount of reasonable attorney fees. Although the 
Plaintiffs' and the State's dispute has taken place in the 
context of whether the common questions predominate, the crux of 
their dispute has really been over how reasonable attorney fees 
should be calculated. Both parties' memoranda implicitly 
recognize that the predomination issue hinges on who is right on 
the attorney fees issue. If the Plaintiffs are correct that 
attorney fees are simply 33% of the lien recovered, then the 
common question of how to calculate attorney fees may 
predominate. On the other hand, if the State is correct that the 
in, the discussion assumes that normally when the State 
consented, it paid attorney fees or discounted its lien and when 
the State denied consent, it did neither. 
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determination of attorney fees is more than a simple mathematical 
formulation, then the common question of how to calculate 
attorney fees does not predominate. 
As already discussed, this Court has rejected the 
Plaintiffs' contention that the State's attorney fees are 
presumptively 33% of the lien recovery. Instead, this Court has 
determined that the State's attorney fees are determined by 
examining the totality of the circumstances under which the 
recipient recovered the State's lien with a special emphasis on 
the fee arrangement the recipient attorney agreed to accept, and 
the circumstances and risks involved at the time the recipient 
requested consent from the State. 
The individual questions involved with this comprehensive 
inquiry will be as varied as the individual recipient's 
circumstances. The first of the individual questions that will 
need to be answered is the amount the recipient agreed to pay his 
own attorney. In those cases, where the fee was based upon an 
hourly, flat fee or some other non-percentage fee arrangement, 
the Court will have to examine the circumstances of each 
individual case to determine the State's fair share. Even where 
the fee arrangement is based upon a fixed percentage, the Court 
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will need to determine that percentage for each individual case. 
As discussed previously, this information is important because 
the recipient's percentage of attorney fees will act as a ceiling 
on the amount of attorney fees the State must pay. While the 
State may often pay a smaller percentage than the recipient paid 
his attorney, the State can never be required to pay a higher 
percentage than the recipient paid his attorney. Of course, even 
if the Court adopted the approach that a "proportionate" (as 
defined by Plaintiffs) fee must be paid in all cases, the Court 
would still have to determine what percent each claimant paid to 
his own counsel.19 This individual issue alone would predominate 
over any common issue. 
The fact finder will then need to examine the circumstances 
of the case at the time the recipient requested consent and 
determine the risks involved in pursuing the claim. In making 
this examination, the fact finder would look at the same 
considerations the recipient's attorney considers when 
19
 Even if the Court used this approach, however, it would 
still reject a presumption of 33% in every case. As mentioned 
previously, the 33% contingent fee is not so prevalent that a 
presumption of 33% should be given. Therefore, the Plaintiff 
would have the burden to establish what percentage he had paid 
his attorney. 
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determining the percentage of attorney fees he will charge in a 
contingency fee case. The fact finder will then need to examine 
how the pursuit of the recipient's claim progressed and how much 
effort went in to procuring the State's recovery. Based on these 
examinations, the fact finder will then determine the reasonable 
percentage of attorney fees the State owes the recipient within 
the range of 20% to 33%. 
In addition to this individual question, however, there are 
numerous other individual questions that would be involved.20 
Because of the myriad individual questions that will necessarily 
take place as part of this examination, there is little question 
that the individual questions involved in this fact-intensive 
inquiry would predominate over the common question in this case. 
The Plaintiffs make much of the fact that the individual 
inquiries involved in this case are primarily inquiries that can 
While the Court will not attempt to make an exhaustive 
list of such individual inquiries, a few of the potential 
individual questions that will be involved are: (1) when the 
request for consent was made, (2) how much investigation has been 
done on the case prior to the request, (3) the likelihood of 
settlement without a trial, (4) whether liability or causation 
was aggressively contested, (5) the complexity of the case, (6) 
whether the case went to trial or settled prior to trial, (7) the 
experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer performing the 
services, and (8) the amount of the Medicaid lien. 
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be categorized as "damage" inquiries. However, the mere fact 
that individual inquiries relate to damages does not mean that 
the inquiries cannot be considered in determining whether common 
questions predominate. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Rochelle 
Communications, Inc., 339 F.3d 294, 307 (5th Cir. 2003) ("'where 
the plaintiffs' damage claims focus almost entirely on facts and 
issues specific to individuals rather than the class as a whole, 
the potential . . . that the class action may degenerate in 
practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried, renders class 
treatment inappropriate.'") (quoting 0'Sullivan v. Countrywide 
Home Loans, 319 F.3d 732, 744 (5th Cir. 2003)). This is 
especially true where, as here, the liability and damage phases 
are closely intertwined. 
The better reasoned view is that the court should examine 
the entire litigation, including the damages phase, in making the 
determination of whether common questions predominate. See 
Windham v. Am. Brands Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 71 (4th Cir. 1977) ("a 
trial judge cannot, in determining the manageability of a 
proposed class action, look exclusively to only one aspect of the 
case . . . ; he can and must look at the case as a whole and . . 
consider proof of damages as well as other issues in the 
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case."). This is not a case where the damages can be calculated 
using a mathematical formula. Rather this is a case where 
calculating damages would involve numerous individual mini-trials 
that would defeat the desired efficiency of having a class action 
case. See Windham, 565 F.2d at 68 ("where the issue of damages 
and impact does not lend itself to . . . a mechanical 
calculation, but requires separate mini-trials of an overwhelming 
large number of individual claims, courts have found that the 
staggering problems of logistics thus created make the damage 
aspect predominate and render the class action unmanageable as a 
class action.'') (quotations omitted). 
Although the Plaintiffs are correct that the Call case is 
not directly on point, its conclusion is applicable: "Judicial 
economy would be little served because the amount of the claim 
for each class member would still need to be determined on an 
individual basis, regardless of class action status." 727 P.2d 
at 183-84. The only claim left in this case is for attorney fees 
and the determination of those attorney fees are an individual 
fact intensive inquiry that makes certifying a class of 
Plaintiffs in the first group inappropriate. 
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2. Cases Where the State Paid Attorney Fees or 
Discounted its Lien 
As previously mentioned, the second group includes those 
claims where the State granted consent to the Plaintiff and 
accordingly paid some attorney fees or discounted its lien. The 
reasons for not certifying a class of Plaintiffs fitting the 
first group also warrant not certifying a class of Plaintiffs 
fitting the second group because, in both groups, the amount of 
attorney fees owed by the State would need to be determined using 
a fact intensive inquiry. However, independent of those reasons, 
there are two additional problems with certifying a class of 
Plaintiffs fitting in the second group. 
The first problem with certifying a class of Plaintiffs in 
the second group is that in many cases, if not most, the 
Plaintiff's attorney entered into a retainer agreement with the 
State whereby the State and the recipient expressly agreed to the 
amount of attorney fees the State would pay. In entering into 
these retainer agreements, § 26-19-7(3) and (4) gives the State 
broad discretion to establish the amount of attorney fees. 
Section 26-19-7(3) states that NX[t]he department's written 
consent, if given, shall state under what terms the interests of 
the department may be represented in an action commenced by the 
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recipient." Section 26-19-7(4) then places a limit on the State 
expressly prohibiting the State from paying "more than 33% of its 
total recovery for attorney's fees." The statute does not 
provide a lower limit on what the State can pay. 
Therefore, by the statute's plain language, the State has 
broad discretion to state the terms of its consent, including the 
amount of attorney fees, as long as it does not pay more than 
33%. The presumption, then, is that where the State has granted 
consent and stated the terms of the representation in good faith, 
the recipient and his attorney are bound by that agreement if 
they accept it. Where a recipient and the State have already 
agreed to the amount of attorney fees, it is not this Court's 
place to change the terms of that agreement.21 
21
 The Plaintiffs spend a brief portion of its memoranda 
contending that these retainer agreements are unethical and 
unenforceable. However, this Court declines to address the 
serious and substantive contention that the State's agreements 
are unethical and unenforceable when the matter has been only 
briefly and collaterally argued. Such an argument should be the 
subject of a separate motion where the matter can be fully 
briefed and considered. Moreover, such a motion could not be 
heard unless the original parties to the retainer agreement were 
included in the case. The Court cannot rule on whether an 
agreement is unethical and unenforceable when the recipient's 
attorney who entered into the agreement is not present in the 
case. However, even if the needed parties were included in the 
case and the Plaintiffs are correct that the retainer agreements 
are unenforceable, then a court would still need to determine 
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However, aside from any agreements that occurred between the 
State and the recipient, there is a second and more serious 
problem with certifying a class of Plaintiffs where the State 
consented. In every case where the State paid an attorney fee or 
discounted its lien, there will be issues involving estoppel, 
waiver, or accord. By accepting the State's attorney fee or 
discount, a question necessarily arises whether the recipient 
waived or is estopped from asserting a right to additional 
attorney fees. This is true whether or not there was any type of 
substantive negotiation between the State and the recipient's 
attorney. 
The problem with certifying a class of Plaintiffs where the 
Plaintiffs accepted a discount or money from the State is that 
estoppel, waiver, and accord are all fact intensive inquiries. 
See State of Utah v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676,678 (Utah 1997) 
(noting the "variety of fact-intensive circumstances" under which 
estoppel can apply); IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt. , 
what attorney fees should be awarded. As a practical matter, the 
cases that involved an unenforceable agreement would be treated 
the same way as the cases where the State never granted consent. 
The Court's conclusion that class status is unwarranted in cases 
where the State denied consent would be equally applicable to 
cases where the agreement was held to be unenforceable. 
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Inc., 2003 UT 5 1 7,73 P.3d 320 ("Waiver is an intensely fact 
dependent question, requiring a trial court to determine whether 
a party has intentionally relinquished a known right, benefit, or 
advantage."); Neiderhauser Builders and Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 
824 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (reversing trial court 
because there was a question of fact regarding accord and 
satisfaction). Because of the fact intensive inquiries regarding 
these legal doctrines that must necessarily occur in cases where 
the State gave a discount or paid an amount of attorney fees to 
the recipient, these cases are not appropriate for class action 
status. 
Moreover, unlike the Plaintiffs in the first group, the 
Plaintiffs in the second group not only have individual questions 
as to damages, but also additional questions as to liability. 
Whether an individual Plaintiff has waived his right to attorney 
fees by accepting fees or a discount from the State is a question 
of liability, not of damages. Class actions are clearly more 
inappropriate when there are not only individual questions 
regarding damages, but also individual questions regarding 
liability. Therefore, class status is even more inappropriate 
50 
/ 1-*/fa 
for Plaintiffs in the second group than it is for the Plaintiffs 
in the first group. 
As should be clear from the Court's discussion, the 
individual questions involved in determining the reasonable 
attorney fees the State owes would by themselves predominate over 
any common questions. Therefore, based on these individual 
questions alone, the class should be decertified. However, it 
should also be noted that there are additional individual 
questions that would potentially arise that further makes 
continued class status inappropriate. 
Two additional individual questions are the State's two 
defenses discussed previously. The State's first potential 
defense that was discussed was where the State satisfied its lien 
wholly through its own efforts and not those of the recipient's 
efforts. Determining whether the lien was procured through the 
State's efforts or the recipient's efforts will be a fact 
intensive inquiry that requires examining the State's specific 
actions in each case where the defense is raised. This defense 
will not be a common question among the class members because 
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there will clearly be cases where the State took little or no 
efforts to recover its lien.22 
The State's second potential defense that was discussed is 
where the recipient's lack of cooperation prevented the State 
from collecting its lien from the third party. As with the 
State's first defense, determining whether the recipient's lack 
of cooperation prevented the State from recovering its lien will 
also be a fact intensive inquiry. Therefore, where the defense 
is raised, it will constitute an individual question not common 
among the class.23 
Aside from the individual questions already discussed, it 
should also be noted that the Plaintiffs' "futility" exception 
would present another individual question that would make class 
Admittedly, the Court does not know how much of an issue 
this will be. It may well be that in the vast majority of cases, 
the State's recovery was clearly through the efforts of the 
recipient and therefore the State will not attempt to use this 
defense. Because it is unknown in how many cases this defense 
will be raised, the Court is not placing great weight on this 
defense as an individual question. 
23
 As with the State's first defense, this defense may also 
not be much of an issue and there may be very few cases where the 
State contends that the recipient's failure to cooperate 
prevented the State from recovering its own lien. For this 
reason, the Court is placing very little weight on this defense 
as well in determining whether common questions predominate. 
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action status unwarranted. As previously discussed, the 
Plaintiffs contend that even where the recipient did not request 
consent from the State, the Court should allow the recovery of 
attorney fees where it would have been futile to ask the State 
for consent due to purported State policy of denying consent for 
certain categories of cases. Although the Court has rejected 
Plaintiffs' request to relax the request for consent requirement, 
if a futility exception applied, it would present an individual 
question based on whether the individual Plaintiff was aware of a 
State policy that made a request for consent futile. If the 
Plaintiff was not aware that the request would be futile, then 
the basis for recognizing the exception would not be present. 
Therefore, were the Plaintiffs correct that there should be a 
futility exception, the exception would provide another 
individual question that would further support the Court's 
reasons for decertifying the class. 
As can be seen from the Court's above discussion, revising 
and certifying a new class of Plaintiffs is unwarranted because 
there is no potential class that would satisfy the requirements 
of Rule 23. The common question among the class members would 
not predominate over the individual questions that exist. Hence, 
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rather than revise or certify a new class, the current class 
should be decertified. Therefore, for the above reasons, the 
State's motion to decertify is hereby GRANTED. 
The Court's decision to decertify the class potentially 
impacts at least some of the various pending motions from the 
parties. In light of this potential impact, the Court directs 
each party to simultaneously submit supplemental briefs by 
January 12, 2007 addressing any impact of today's ruling on the 
various outstanding motions. Once the parties have filed the 
supplemental briefs, this Court will schedule a hearing to hear 
arguments on all remaining outstanding motions. 
DATED this ^7- day of December, 2006. 
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Dear Judge Quinn: 
I am in receipt of your December 22, 2006, 54-page Order ruling on the 
decertification motion. The last paragraph indicates the following: 
In light of this potential impact, the Court directs each party to simultaneously submit 
supplemental briefs by January 129 200 7 addressing any impact of today's ruling on 
the various outstanding motions. Once the parties have filed the supplemental briefs, 
this Court will schedule a hearing to hear arguments on all remaining outstanding 
motions. 
12/22/06 Order, p. 54 (emphasis added). I assume that the intent of that language is to allow you to 
rule on other pending motions so that a future appeal will address all possible issues. If that is the 
intent, I think that is a good thing. The only problem is that asking for Briefs by January 12th 
contemplates hearing these matters at a future hearing, when the time for appealing the 
decertification motion will have undoubtedly passed. 
I would have to interpret an order granting decertification as a "final order," which 
means that my time to appeal would end on January 21, 2007 (if I am counting the days correctly). 
I doubt very much that we could brief and hear further matters on or before that date. Further, if I 
file a Notice of Appeal there is a question in my mind as to whether or not it would divest you of any 
jurisdiction to hear these other matters. 
One solution to this problem may be to amend your 12/22/06 Order and make it clear 
that this Order is not a final Order until such time as you have ruled on these other matters. Perhaps 
also I could file a Notice of Appeal with a stipulation of counsel and agreement by the Court that the 
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Notice could later be amended to include the other matters. It is an unusual situation and I am not 
quite sure exactly how to proceed, but I do need to protect the right to appeal, as you can well 
imagine. 
I would appreciate hearing from you shortly on this matter. 
Verv 
RBS:jac 
cc: Phillip S. Lott, Esq. (via fax & mail) 
Q:\CLIENT\1496Houghton\l. A\1.2 C\Quinn.010907.wpd 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL HOUGHTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No: 950907491 
Judge: ANTHONY B. QUINN 
Date: January 12, 2007 
This Minute Entry will clarify that the Court's Order of December 
22, 2006 is not intended as a final order. Additional Motions will 
be heard on January 23, 2007 that may result in modification of the 
Order. Until the Order is signed following the 
January 23rd hearing, the December 22nd Order should be considered 
provisional. 
Page 1 (last) 
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PHILIP S. LOTT (5750) 
STEVEN A. COMBE (5456) 
Assistant Utah Attorneys General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
PAUL HOUGHTON, et ai, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et ai, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS: 
1) FOR ASSESSMENT OF INTEREST ON 
DAMAGES, 
2) FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES, 
3) TO DETERMINE THAT PLAINTIFFS' 
CLAIMS DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN 
"INJURY" UNDER THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
AND ARE EQUITABLE IN NATURE, 
AND 
4) FOR SANCTIONS DUE TO 
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE. 
Civil No.\J950907491 
Judge Anthony B. Quinn 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court for hearing on January 23, 2006, of Plaintiffs' 
Motions: 1) For Assessment of Interest on Damages, 2) For Award of Attorney Fees, 3) To Determine 
That Plaintiffs' Claims Do Not Constitute An "Injury" Under the Governmental Immunity Act, and 
4) For Sanctions Due to Spoliation of Evidence; Plaintiffs appearing by and through their counsel, 
Robert B. Sykes, and Defendants appearing by and through their counsel, Philip S. Lott; the Court 
/ I -3*2/ / 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
- Third lufjich! District 
FEB 1 5 2307 
SALI LAKt 
Deputy Clerk" 
having reviewed the pleadings, received oral arguments from counsel, and being otherwise fully 
advised, FINDS: 
Impact of December 22,2006 Order 
1. The Court's December 22, 2006 Order on Motion for Decertification necessarily impacts 
Plaintiffs'remaining motions as addressed herein. 
2. Because the individually named Plaintiffs are free to proceed on their individual claims, the 
December 22,2006 Order does not terminate the entire litigation. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Assessment of Interest on Damages 
3. In the December 22, 2006 Order, the Court rejected Plaintiffs' contention that the State's 
attorney fees are presumptively 33% and, instead, held that any attorney fees due will have to be 
determined on an individual, case by case basis. 
4. Because the amount of any attorney fees due will have to be determined on a case by case 
basis and will not be a liquidated amount, Plaintiffs' cannot be awarded prejudgment interest and their 
motion should be denied. 
Plaintiffs9 Motion for Award of Attorney Fees 
5. The individually named Plaintiffs' claims for attorney fees are mooted by the December 22, 
2006 Order which prevents this lawsuit from proceeding as a class action. 
6. The individually named Plaintiffs' claims are for personal, individual awards of money. 
7. The cost of pursuing the individually named Plaintiffs' personal pecuniary interests does not 
require subsidization by allowing a separate recovery for attorney fees incurred in prosecuting their 
claims. 
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8. The general rule in Utah, that attorney fees cannot be recovered by a prevailing party unless a 
statute or contract authorizes such an award, should be followed in this case and the motion for attorney 
fees should be denied. 
Plaintiffs' Motions to Determine That Plaintiffs' Claims Do Not Constitute an "Injury" 
under the Governmental Immunity Act and Are Equitable in Nature 
9. These motions are directed at determining whether the applicable statute of limitations 
extends beyond the limitations period allowed by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
10. Because there is no evidence that the claims of the individually named Plaintiffs arose 
before the statute of limitations under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, these motions are moot 
and should be denied. 
Plaintiffs9 Motion for Sanctions Due to Spoliation of Evidence 
11. Because at this time there is no evidence of spoliation of evidence that would affect the 
claims of the individually named Plaintiffs, this motion should be denied without prejudice. 
The December 22, 2006 Order on Motion for Decertification Is Now a Final Order 
12. The Court's January 12, 2007 Minute Entry provided that the December 22, 2006 Order was 
not intended to be a final order until after consideration of the additional motions addressed herein. 
13. There will be no modifications to the December 22, 2006 Order on Motion for 
Decertification. 
14. With the signing of this Order, the December 22, 2006 Order is now a final order. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motions: 1) For Assessment of Interest on Damages, 2) For Award of Attorney 
3 
Fees, and 3) To Determine That Plaintiffs' Claims Do Not Constitute An "Injury" Under the 
Governmental Immunity Act are denied. 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Due to Spoliation of Evidence is denied without prejudice. 
3. The December 22, 2006 Order on Motion for Decertification is now a final order. 
DATED this /S? day of February, 2007. 
BY THE O 
Appfloved as to form: 
District 
Philip S. Lott 
/]7°id 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed Order Denying 
Plaintiffs' Motions: 1) For Assessment of Interest on Damages, 2) For Award of Attorney Fees, 
3) To Determine That Plaintiffs' Claims Do Not Constitute An "Injury" Under the Governmental 
Immunity Act, and 4) For Sanctions Due to Spoliation of Evidence was mailed, postage pre-paid, 
this 26th day of January, 2007, to the following: 
Robert B. Sykes 
Alyson E. Carter 
ROBERT B. SYKES & ASSOCIATES 
311 South State Street, #240 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
/I -?&*-
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May 30, 2007 
ROBERT B. SYKES 
ROBERT B. SYKES & ASSOCIATES 
311 S STATE ST STE 240 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-2320 
By. 
FILED DlSTHiOT Cb 
Third Judicial Disr -A 
MAY 30 2007 
SALT LAKE C O U N T Y A \ 
Deputy •> 
Re: Houghton v. DOH Utah Supreme Court No. 20070197 
District Court No. 950907491 
Dear Mr. SYKES: 
Enclosed is a copy of the order granting the interlocutory appeal 
entered by the Utah Supreme Court on May 29, 2007, in the above 
referenced case. 
This order takes the place of a notice of appeal. A docketing 
statement is not required. However, in accordance with Rule 11, 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure you must make 
arrangements for any necessary transcripts or inform us that no 
transcripts are required. If transcripts are requested, payment 
arrangements must be made. See Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
11. This should be done timely. Once this process is complete, 
the district court will be notified that the record index should 
be prepared and sent to the Utah Supreme Court. The briefing 
schedule will be set upon receipt of the record index on appeal. 
If you have any questions, please contact me at 578-3900. 
Sincerely, 
£^£+^^ 
Celia Urcino 
Deputy Clerk 
Enc. 
cc: THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
DEBRA J. MOORE 
PHILIP S. LOTT 
PEGGY E STONE ^ < f e 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
oo 
Paul Houghton, Billie Henderson, 
individually and each as 
representative of a class, 
Damian Henderson, Wayne Rubens, 
Ron Roes and Susan Roes, who are 
other members of these classes, 
similarly situated, 
Petitioners, 
v. Case No. 20070197-SC 
950907491 
Department of Health, The Office 
of Recovery Services, The Department 
of Human Services and The State 
of Utah (the "State Defendants") 
and Rod L. Betit, Director of the 
Department of Health and Director 
of Department of Human Services; 
Emma Chacone, Executive Director 
of the Office of Recovery Services; 
John Does 1-50 and Jane Does 1-50 
(the "individual defendants"), 
Respondents. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for 
Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order, filed on March 7, 
2007. A response to the petition was filed on April 12, 2007. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to rule 5 of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the petition for permission to appeal the 
interlocutory order is provisionally granted. Review will be 
limited to the following questions, which the parties are 
requested to brief. 
1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction, pursuant to rule 5 
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, to review the December 
22, 2006 "order on motion for decertification", in light of 
the district court's subsequent minute entry, dated January 
i\-^\°\ 
0oo — 
FILED 
t~,x\ hpncs t ATF COURTS 
i.HA.H Art L-—• ••-
HAY 2 S 200? 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on May 30, 2007, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or 
placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to: 
ROBERT B SYKES 
ROBERT B SYKES & ASSOCIATES 
311 S STATE ST STE 240 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-2320 
DEBRA J. MOORE 
PHILIP S. LOTT 
PEGGY E STONE 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FLR 
PO BOX 140856 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0856 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: JODI BAILEY / MARINA DAVIS 
4 50 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
Dated this May 30, 2007. 
By C^CX/^L /C//^a^i£L 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 20070197 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 950907491 
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